Democracy Empowerment Project
Terminal Evaluation

Final Report

15 December 2016

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Electoral processes in Tanzania 1
1.2. Democratic Empowerment Project 2
Box 1: DEP Expected Outcomes 2
Table 1: Financial Contributions to DEP 3
Box 2: DEP Budget and Expenditures 2013 - 2016 3
1.3. Terminal Evaluation 4
Box 3: DEP Organizational Structure (Per Project Document) 4
2. FINDINGS 5
2.1. Component 1: Support for legal and institutional reform 5
Table 2: Letters of Agreement for Component 1 5
2.1.1. Output 1.1: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections 6
2.1.2. Output 1.2: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes 7
2.2. Component 2: EMBs supported to improve integrity of planning and operations and overall management capacity 9
Table 3: Letters of Agreement for Component 2 9
2.2.1. Output 2.1: EMBs planning, management, execution of key tasks enhanced to support holding of credible elections 10
2.2.2. Output 2.2: EMB systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections 12
2.3. Component 3. Support inclusive participation in electoral and political processes 18
2.3.1. Output 3.1: Increased number of women, youth and PWD seeking political party nominations 18
Table 4: Letters of Agreement with UN Women and UNESCO 19
2.3.2. Output 3.2: Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media, CBOs) promote participation of women, youth, PWD in party leadership and nomination 20
2.4. Component 4. Support national peace infrastructure to mitigate and resolve election-related conflict 22
Table 5: Letters of Agreement for Component 4 22
2.4.1. Output 4.1: Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (national police) to maintain security and integrity of electoral events 23
2.4.2. Output 4.2: Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections 25
2.5. Component 5. Project Management and Advisory Services 27
2.5.1. Project design 27
2.5.2 Project management and implementation 29

Box 4: Final DEP Project Organogram 29
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32
3.1. Conclusions 32
3.1. Challenges for future 34
3.2. Recommendations 35
Attachment 1: Donor Assistance to the 2015 Electoral Processes 37
Attachment 2: Results Framework 38
Attachment 3: Revised Framework 39
Attachment 4: Results and Indicator Framework (Final) 40
Annex 1: Persons Met 63
Annex 2: References 67
Annex 4: Evaluation Inception Plan 70
Acronyms 76

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The Democratic Empowerment Project (DEP) was a four year project (2013 - 2016) designed to enhance the credibility and capacity of key democratic institutions in Tanzania to effectively implement their electoral and political processes (EPP) functions. It was a USD 22.2 million project supported by nine development partners, Canada, Denmark, European Union (EU), Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It was an electoral cycle project intended to support a constitutional referendum expected in 2014 (which was not held) and the general elections held in October 2015. The project worked on both the mainland of Tanzania and in the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar. DEP stopped activities with the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) at development partner request after the ZEC annulled the 2015 Zanzibar results on the two islands which raised concerns from election observers and development partners.[1] The opposition Civic United Front (CUF) boycotted the rerun.

DEP has four main programmatic components: 1) *legal and institutional reforms for credible elections;* 2) *support to electoral management bodies (EMBs) to improve the integrity of planning and operations and its overall management capacity;* 3) *support for inclusive participation in the electoral and political processes; and* 4) *support for the national peace infrastructure to mitigate and resolve election-related conflicts.* The inclusive participation activities focused on the inclusion of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs). DEP used a One UN approach with UNDP responsible for its overall management and United Nations Entity on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (UN Women) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) responsible for the gender and social inclusion and community radio aspects respectively. DEP used a direct implementation modality (DIM) managed by a project management team (PMT) headed by a Project Manager and Chief Technical Adviser (CTA). The National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the ZEC were the primary counterparts along with other key institutions and stakeholders in the electoral and political processes-- political parties, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the Tanzania Police Force (TPF), the judiciary, civil society organizations (CSOs), and community radio. Funding was also provided directly to some of the partners through Letters of Agreement (LOAs).

UNDP Tanzania commissioned this independent final evaluation of DEP. This evaluation took place in October and November 2016. The project terminates on 31 December 2016.

Findings

Output 1.1: Legal and institutional framework reformed to contribute to the holding of democratic elections. DEP supported multi-stakeholder discussions by the NEC, ZEC and ORPP and technical assistance helped ensure gender equity and inclusivity elements were addressed within their review processes. The legal reforms have yet to be adopted, but EMBs/ORRP policies were strengthened in this regard. Legal and institutional reforms are still needed especially in terms of independence of the EMBs. Training was provided to political parties in collaborative leadership but its one-off nature and too late start limited its impact. There is still a continuing need for this type of support.

Output 1.2: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes. Support for the peaceful resolution of conflict cross-cut DEP components (as did gender and inclusion). DEP support enabled the ORPP to develop a dispute resolution mechanism for inter and intra-party conflict that is expected to be useful in the future.

[1] EU Election Observation Mission, *Tanzania, General Elections, 2015*, pp 8 - 9

Training with the judiciary on electoral complaint adjudication was a best practice and resulted in the more timely resolution of complaints for the 2015 elections.

Output 2.1: EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks enhanced to support the holding of credible elections. EMB support was a main focus for DEP. It achieved its objective of improving EMB strategic planning and policy making, but the degree is unknown without better project performance indicators. Observers noted that both EMBs had "*sufficient levels of preparedness for the administration of the [2015] electoral process and in conducting key operations."*[2] Several issues affected project performance for Component 2 including: 1) the level of EMB interest in the different activities and type of assistance. The more substantive results were found where the EMBs had higher levels of interest; 2) the parcelled nature of the activities between DEP outputs and among its implementers which kept much of the focus and results at the activity level; 3) the appropriateness of long term TA led by a CTA when only one of the EMBs was willing to accept long-term embedded advisors or the notion of long-term TA; and, 4) the different levels of project focus on the normative aspects of free, fair and credible elections with the primary focus on promoting gender mainstreaming and increasing inclusivity which are the areas with the most visible results.

Output 2.2: EMBs systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections. The DEP project focus on women, youth and PWD helped ensure their inclusion in EMB stakeholder and voter education meetings and for some aspects of the electoral process such as tactile ballots, improved EMB policies and the adoption of gender and social inclusion policies for the ZEC and ORPP. Observers also noted this focus was visible in the voter education efforts. The facilitation of EMB stakeholder meetings helped to open and maintain space for dialogue and increased participants understanding of the processes, but much more remains to be done for outreach, information dissemination and voter education. ICT support was uneven. Some components, such as the Electoral Management System (EMS) needed better grounding in, and participation by, the EMBs which did not use parts of the system. It also raises questions of building software systems from scratch rather than adapting existing technologies. Rehabilitating server rooms and equipment helped protect the integrity of the Zanzibar voter registry and facilitated the adoption of the biometric voter registration (BVR) technology on the Mainland which needed upgraded ICT cabling, etc. Useful capacity needs assessments were done for both EMBs but needed to be better used to target participants for the professional trainings. Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) trainings were appreciated by the EMBs which had several persons accredited as trainers.

Output 3.1: Increased number of women, youth and PWD seeking political party nominations. The Tanzania Women Cross-Party Platform (TWCP) worked with political parties creating a national database of about 2,300 women, youth and PWD aspirants and engaging the parties in a useful exercise. However, it revealed the weakness of the parties which had difficulties obtaining aspirant names. Smaller parties provided long lists for potential aspirants but this appeared to be more opportunistic in nature (for the training per diems) than for the promotion of female party members. Verifying actual aspirants took time, delaying the start of training and limiting its effectiveness and relevance. Nevertheless, more than half of those who participated in the training felt it had increased their confidence to run for office. Data was not available for how many actually obtained nominations and ran for office, but the ultimate value for this effort will likely be in the 2020 elections if mentoring and training continue for aspirants through the cycle.

Output 3.2: Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media, CBOs) promote participation of women, youth and PWD in party leadership and nominations. This output was directly relevant to the need for more inclusive party leadership and party policies. CSO and community radios actively promoted the participation of women, youth and to a lesser extent PWD. This helped to raise

[2] Ibid, p 6

awareness and provided space for CSOs to bring up these issues directly with parties. Anecdotal evidence pointed to increased media interest in issues related to women, youth and PWD among those who participated in training, including media other than community radio.

Output 4.1: Strengthened capacity of key stakeholders (national police) to maintain the security and integrity of the electoral events. DEP took a very professional and effective approach to supporting the TPF, using policing professionals to train senior and mid-level officers; and a train-the-trainers (TOT) approach on training for human rights, gender and on the role of the police in elections. These trainers then reached a third of the police, more than double the target. The TPF was an engaged partner, took best advantage of the assistance, and used it to improve their electoral security engagement and reduce incidents of police violence during the 2015 elections. DEP support for upgrading the TPF's Incident Reporting and Response System (IRRS) was a best practice; DEP IT experts worked in partnership with TPF programmers to develop the system which the police are still using for their work. They are not only maintaining the system but expanded it with the government-funded purchase of more than 4,000 digital radios to complement the 120 radios purchased by the project.

Output 4.2: Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections. Despite a late start which limited the number of dialogues and attendance by some participants, the multi-stakeholder dialogue forums helped bridge divides and bring different actors together to identify areas of potential conflict and find common solutions. The inclusion of faith based organizations (FBOs) and the media was effective in increasing reach and providing safe spaces for difficult discussions. The continuation of the efforts with the Office of the Mufti in Zanzibar (OMZ) and the interfaith approach in the post-electoral period in Zanzibar reportedly helped to calm tensions in the lead up to the electoral rerun. The integration of community radio as an actor and as a tool in the dialogue processes increased the effectiveness of the efforts.

Project design and management: The design was logical and framed around democratic empowerment which was, and still is, relevant and needed. The lessons from previous projects were incorporated, such as starting activities early through the cycle approach and fast-tracking procurement, but were lost during implementation. The benefits of reworking the results framework were not clear as it split common elements between outputs lowering their focus to activity levels. The One UN approach followed the institutional comparative advantages of the three UN agencies but implementation was largely separate with coordination meetings held weekly. UN Women and UNESCO synergized their components with their own institutional programmes and vision contributing to the broader efforts for democratic empowerment.

The design focused on the supply side. More attention to the demand side could have strengthened the project. Adjusting to the change of roles within the PMT was problematic when the long term TA were not embedded in the NEC. This created tensions and conflicting ideas of roles and reporting lines that affected the PMT's work and relations. UNDP hired experienced project staff but did not provide them with adequate delegation of authority to effectively manage DEP until late in the project. Procurements were extremely slow and fast track procurement was also not requested until 2015. DEP steering and technical committee mechanisms were too cumbersome to provide effective, timely project oversight and information sharing. Their use by participants to question EMBs on the status of the process diverted attention from project management and oversight. The DIM mechanism was appropriate for the nature of the project and the context within Tanzania.

Conclusions

Democratic empowerment assistance was needed and relevant for the 2015 electoral cycle. The range of stakeholders and partners selected were highly relevant to strengthening Tanzania's electoral and political processes as were the areas that received DEP support.

The electoral cycle approach was a best practice and appropriate to the Tanzanian context and needs. However, delays and management issues, along with late inputs and continuing reworking of the results framework, undermined the cycle approach affecting its relevance, effectiveness and likely impact. It also requires a commitment by the EMBs to effectively use the assistance offered, without which the project's potential effectiveness and impact is limited.

The One UN approach added value to the project and depth and dimension to most components. However, their efforts needed more programmatic integration within the project itself.

DEP results were more substantial where it was conceived and implemented as a cohesive programme targeting the higher level outcomes. Results were also more substantial where DEP worked in partnership with a national institution or partner that was committed and drove the effort, such as with the Judiciary and TPF.

Outcome level results noted in 2015 EPP are likely the cumulative effects of UNDP-managed projects and other projects undertaken in the sector. Attribution of results to DEP is difficult in most case without better indicators. However, it appears likely that DEP strengthened key institutions to more effectively implement their election and political function in that it:

- ***strengthened institutional policies and systems as well as increased professionalism in electoral administration*** which contributed to the holding of more inclusive[3] and better organized elections;
- ***opened space for more inclusive dialogue and CSO participation with EMBs and other institutions*** to advocate for the rights of women and to a lesser degree youth and PWD,
- ***contributed to improved draft legislation*** for the elections, political parties and political party financing which incorporated the input of a wider range of stakeholders focused on non-discrimination against women, youth and PWD and strengthening the credibility aspects for the process;
- ***contributed to a more peaceful electoral climate and process*** than would have been likely the case without assistance;
- ***increased awareness of stakeholders and institutions on concepts of inclusion and gender mainstreaming.*** These concepts were institutionalized within the EMBs and ORPP;
- ***strengthened the role of the ORPP in resolving inter/intra party disputes*** with political parties through the development of a dispute resolution mechanism and increased the space for party discussions and negotiations;
- ***strengthened elements of electoral justice*** by increasing the knowledge of judges, magistrates and prosecutors on electoral laws and reducing the time to resolve electoral cases;
- ***strengthened the capacity of the TPF to respond more appropriately for electoral security and*** strengthened its overall ability ***to respond to citizen's needs in a more timely and appropriate manner*** with respect to human rights and gender responsiveness***;*** and
- ***strengthened the role of community radios in inclusive dialogue and peace building*** and started their integration into the networks for peace.

The EMBs demonstrated their ability to deliver elections in 2015, decreasing the relevance and need for long term resident TA for the future. There are still needs for technical assistance and EMB strengthening but most of these could be met through the provision of shorter-term TA and other capacity building efforts. ***Improving the enabling environment for elections and the independence of key institutions remain key challenges***. Tanzania is still in transition towards more inclusive, democratic governance and still needs support to strengthen its democratic development and key institutions within the country.

[3] Inclusive in terms of participation of women, youth and PWD.

Recommendations

Continued electoral cycle support to strengthen the electoral and political processes and key actors and institutions engaged in those processes. This effort needs to start with a frank discussion on the events in Zanzibar and on the commitment and steps needed to resolve the impasse and avoid its repetition in the future. Assuming this is addressed, the next project should start early enough in the process so that it can support needed reforms and a resolution for Zanzibar. It should also adopt a programmatic and developmental approach and ensure all project activities and components are synergized and mutually supportive regardless of the nature of implementation. Funding should be used carefully, targeting areas where it can make the most difference, based on needs assessments and analysis of the 2015-2016 experience. Areas of focus should include:

- ***Improving the enabling environment for free and fair elections*** through support for legal and institutional reforms, institution and citizen advocacy and dissemination of information
- ***Continued strengthening of the electoral, political and judicial institutions*** to more effectively fill their EPP roles. Expand assistance where there are engaged and committed partners and rethink assistance where there is not.
- ***Increasing the knowledgeable participation of parties and voters.*** Civic education is a demonstrated need and links could be made between educational and other sectors and EPP institutions.
- ***Strengthening the political leadership of women, youth and PWD*** and ensure the inclusion of marginalized groups. Expand this based on mapping of geographic and demographic areas of turnout, elections-related conflict and violence against women in past elections to improve targeting.
- ***Strengthening the capacity of EMBs and the ORPP in taking up a gender equality and social inclusion agenda*** and/or implementing the policies/ strategies already adopted to ensure greater effectiveness in the implementation of these components within future electoral administration.
- ***Enhancing electoral security, integrity and justice*** measures among key stakeholders and actors by continuing Component 4 type of activities and targeting areas prone to conflict and/or electoral issues, and enhancing the institutional accountability aspects of the processes and institutions.
- ***Strengthening the political analysis,*** situational mapping, scenario development and contingency planning for the project, identify potential triggers and benchmarks that would generate review of the situation and initiate deterrence and/or mitigation measures.
- ***Developing an early warning system for electoral integrity issues and conflict*** that would feed into the situational mapping and analysis and link directly to programmatic content and targeting for EPP-related programming.

Resolve issues at the design stage including agreements between UN agencies and other implementers on the scope and type of activities and their level of integration into the project, and conditions for assistance. Adopt a flexible results framework and make refinements to the work plans rather than the frameworks. Establish M&E indicators and targets at start of the project.

Ensure synergistic programming with other UNDP-supported and development partner projects, especially those working on good governance, with political parties, parliament, education and others to ensure mutually supportive and coordinated programming***.***

Ensure quicker start up and continue activities well after the event. ***Streamline project management and reporting structures*** with an emphasis on more programmatic development

assistance with technical assistance[4] provided on an as needed basis. Provide the PMT with adequate delegation of authority and ask for fast track procurement at project start up.

Develop routine channels for project consultations with stakeholders and development partners apart from formal steering and technical committee mechanisms to foster a greater sense of participation and partnership in the implementation of the programme.

Continued use of the DIM implementation mechanism in the Tanzanian context. Consideration should be given to which government agencies should be counterparts since assistance is provided to a broad group of stakeholders with differing levels of interest in the project. Continued use of LOAs to transfer funds to other partners to help implement different elements of the project.

[4] TA is used here to refer to providing expertise on a specific aspect of electoral administration, such as the selection of a BVR model for voter registration. General technical advice on how to improve the processes should always be part of a broader programmatic effort focused on building the capacity of the stakeholders to achieve the higher level objectives of the programme.

1. Introduction

1.1. Electoral processes in Tanzania

After nearly three decades of single party rule, Tanzania re-established a multiparty political system in 1992.[5] The country conducted its first multiparty elections in 1995. Since then, it has held periodic and regular elections every five years. In 2015, Tanzania held the fifth presidential, parliamentary and councillors' elections. Unlike previous elections, a number of important events preceded the 2015 elections, which made them distinctive and more competitive. One of these events was the constitutional review process which led to the unofficial coalition of the four opposition parties into UKAWA.[6] The coalition had the former Prime Minister, Mr. Edward Ngoyai Lowasa who defected from the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) as its presidential candidate thereby contributing to the competitiveness of the 2015 elections.

Tanzania conducts elections under the guide of several legal documents. These include the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, Elections Act 1985, Election Expenses Act 2010, and Political Parties Act 1992 among others. Zanzibar as a distinct part of the union, conducts elections under the Constitution of Zanzibar 1984, Zanzibar Elections Act 1984, and Political Parties Act 1992 to cite a few. Institutionally, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) manages union elections while the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) manages elections in the Isles. Tanzania uses the first-past-the post electoral system.

A widely held observation by both domestic and international stakeholders is that the legal and institutional frameworks for elections suffer distinct challenges. They have identified such challenges as the lack of independence of the EMBs due to their composition, appointment procedures, lack of an independent budget and inadequate funding among others.[7] In 1995 for instance, a leading domestic observer, the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) certified the 1995 elections as free but not fair. TEMCO argued that the elections were unfair because of the many problems, irregularities and managerial inadequacies.[8] As such, stakeholders both domestic and international have called for legal and institutional reforms to the holding of democratic and credible elections

Tanzania through its EMBs has asked for and received electoral assistance from the international community since 1995. For instance, NEC has received a considerable amount of funds from donors to manage elections. In the first multiparty elections in 1995, NEC reported contributions of Tshs 8,590,417,212 (USD 4,826,077) for election administration.[9] NEC used the money for election administration purposes ranging from voter education, seminars for presiding officers, printing of ballot papers and various election forms, transport and distribution of election materials, making of ballot boxes to cite some.[10] In the 2000 elections, NEC reported donor contributions of Tshs 5,767,370,900 (USD 3,240,096) equivalent to 14.46 percent of the total costs. In 2005, donor contributions amounted to USD 9.53 million.[11] Likewise, NEC reported donor assistance in the

[5] Tanzania is a United Republic after the union of the two independent states of Tanganyika (now commonly referred to as Mainland Tanzania) and Peoples Republic of Zanzibar on 26 April 1964.

[6] UKAWA literally stands for Coalition for Peoples Constitution. The coalition was formed by four political parties namely, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), Civic United Front (CUF), National Convention for Constitution and Reform (NCCR-M), and National League for Democracy (NLD) to advocate for a people-centred constitution.

[7] European Union Observation Mission (EU OM 2010; Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO 1997, 2001, 2006, 20110; EU EOM 2010; TEMCO 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2011).

[8] TEMCO, *The 1995 general elections in Tanzania*, p 252

[9] NEC, *Report of the National Electoral Commission on the 1995 presidential, parliamentary and councillors elections,* p 16

[10] Ibid, 8-9

[11] NEC 2006 p. 15.

administration of the 2010 general elections.[12] ZEC has received similar assistance as well. The mapping for all donor assistance to Tanzania for the 2015 electoral process is provided in Attachment 1.

UNDP has been a channel for coordinating electoral assistance through its management of a multi-donor basket fund. It has managed three large electoral assistance projects in Tanzania. These are the 2000-2005 Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Project; the 2005-2010 Election Support Project (ESP); and, the 2013-2016 Democratic Empowerment Project (DEP). The ESP supported a wide range of activities in preparation for the polls, including technical assistance to the election management bodies (EMBs), procurement of electoral materials and voter registration equipment.[13] Other assistance is provided by donors bilaterally and through other mechanisms.

1.2. Democratic Empowerment Project

The DEP project was designed as a USD 22.5 million four year project intended to support key institutions to effectively implement their election and political functions. It was based on the findings of an October-November 2012 United Nations Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) conducted by the UN Electoral Assistance Department (EAD) and the evaluations of UNDP Tanzania's previous electoral support projects. Particular attention was paid to the lessons learned from those projects and in ensuring an electoral cycle and capacity building approach.

The NAM was done following a May 2012 request by the National Electoral Commission for electoral assistance for the period leading up to the 2015 general elections. Challenges noted included preparations for a constitutional referendum that was expected in early 2014 along with a major update of the voter registry. The constitutional review process that had already started also raised issues of electoral management reform. The NEC also requested support for further professionalization of its staff and for the decentralization of its structures down to the district level.

The NAM recommended the DEP project focus on: capacity development and support for EMB reforms, with legal and institutional reforms identified as a priority need; civic and voter education and related communications activities; support to foster inclusive participation in elections targeting women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural voters; operational and technical support to the EMBs using an electoral cycle approach; Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) training for professional development; conflict prevention and community dialogues to ensure a peaceful environment for the elections; support for election-related dispute resolution structures; and, support to political parties in technical areas such as identification of female candidates and training, platform development, and updating the code of conduct. The NAM also recommended the direct implementation modality (DIM) and the high level engagement of the Resident Coordinator (RC) with national authorities, in concert with relevant Heads of Missions, on issues such as electoral funding, integrity of the electoral processes and enhancing political dialogue especially on constitutional issues.[14] The DEP project document was signed on March 12 and 13, 2013 with the Ministry of Finance, National Election Commission and Zanzibar Election Commission. It had a

Box 1: DEP Expected Outcomes

UNDAP Outcome:

7: Key institutions effectively implement their election and political functions

UNDAP Outputs:

7.4: Election Management bodies better manage the election cycle through the application of integrated management systems

7.6: Political Parties improve internal party democracy

7.7: Women assume leadership roles and positions in politics and EMBs

[12] NEC 2011.

[13] http://www.tz.undp.org/content/tanzania/en/home/operations/about_undp.html accessed 12 November 2016

[14] United Nations, *Report of the Electoral Needs Assessment Mission, Tanzania*, pps 20 - 21

project period of January 2013 to June 2016 which was subsequently amended to extend the project to the end of December 2016.

The project had five components and anticipated outputs:

1. *Legal and institutional reform*;
2. *EMB supported to improve integrity of planning and operations, and management capacity*;
3. *Inclusive participation in electoral and political processes*;
4. *National peace infrastructure supported to mitigate and resolve election-related conflict*;
5. *Management of DEP project operations and program delivery*.

These were intended to contribute to the 2011- 2015 United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) outcome of *Key institutions effectively implement their election and political functions* (Box 1). This in turn would contribute to Tanzania's 2010 - 2015 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty's Goals for Governance and Accountability and to the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty's Goals for Good Governance and National Unity. The project's original results framework (Attachment 2) was revised during the project which re-organized and refined some of the outputs and their sub-outputs (Attachment 3).

Table 1: Financial Contributions to DEP

Donor	Amount	Amount USD
Canada CIDA (from ESP)	CAD 3,000,000 USD 236,943	2,964,657
Denmark	USD 1,267,955	1,267,955
European Union	Euro 4,700,000	5,153,509
Finland (from ESP)	USD 957,927	957,927
Ireland	USD 653,595	653,595
Norway (One Fund)	USD 990,000	990,000
Sweden (One Fund)	SEK 25,000,000	3,322,175
Switzerland	USD 1,900,000	1,900,000
UK/DFID (from ESP) UK DFID	USD 973,686 GBP 1,925,000	4,007,755
UNDP	USD 1,000,000	1,000,000
TOTAL		***22,217,573***

The main partners were expected to be the NEC and ZEC to improve their capacity to conduct elections in a credible manner, and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), the Tanzania Police Force (TPF), the Judiciary, political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs) and media to engage more meaningfully with the electoral process and with the EMBs in order to foster a democratic environment in Tanzania.[15]

The DEP project included a basket fund that pooled funding from nine development partners and UNDP (Table 1). This included funding that was left over from the previous ESP project (USD 2,168,556) and USD 4,312,175 channelled to the project through the UN One Fund. The project was fully funded and the budget increased to USD 22,964,820 to cover more post-election work and the extension of the project for an additional six month. None of the funding was earmarked for specific activities although there were understandings that some of the funds that were added later would cover particular areas, such as police training.

Box 2: DEP Budget and Expenditures 2013 - 2016
by Components



Budget = Original budget from Project Document. 6 = Contingency

Originally, more than half of the project funding (58 percent) was anticipated to support the EMBs (Box 2). Legal reform was anticipated to use five percent of the budget, inclusive participation seven percent, and peaceful elections 10 percent. Project management was expected to require nine percent of the project budget and 11 percent was reserved for

[15] DEP, *Project Document*, p 53

contingencies. The budget was realigned during implementation, reducing the overall total for the EMBs to less than half the budget (42 percent), and more than doubling the amounts anticipated for legal reform and inclusive participation. It also increased the amount focused on peaceful elections to 12 percent.

The DEP project is executed through a direct implementation modality intended to support national management and coordination structures. According to the Project Document, it has a Project Steering Committee (PSC) that was responsible for project oversight, with guidance provided by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA). The PSC was to be co-chaired by the NEC/ZEC and the UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative. Project staff included a Project Manager, Operations Manager, and technical experts for the different elements of the project which made up the Project Management Team (PMT) (Box 3).[16]

Box 3: DEP Organizational Structure (Per Project Document)



The CTA and technical assistance (TA) team were to be embedded in the EMBs with the rest of the project working out of a rented project office. A One UN approach was used for the implementation of the project with UN Women to be responsible for mainstreaming gender and Component 3 (inclusive participation), and with UNESCO for the media aspects (community radio) of the project. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan was to be done within the first six months of the project. An independent midterm evaluation of DEP was done in August 2015.

1.3. Terminal Evaluation

UNDP Tanzania commissioned this independent terminal evaluation of the DEP project. This evaluation is expected to provide UNDP, project partners and stakeholders with an independent review of the programme which is expected to be used to improve future assistance in these areas.

In particular, the evaluation was to:

1. Assess the relevance, efficiency, performance and sustainability of the project interventions taking into consideration the project objectives; and,
2. Examine the appropriateness of the form of assistance provided, with a view to draw lessons and make recommendations for future election support programming through the cycle to the 2020 General Election.

The final evaluation took place in October - November 2016, with the field work done in Tanzania from 18 October - 4 November 2016. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson, International Team Leader; Consolata Raphael, National Expert; and, John Gwanyemba, National Expert. The team undertook a qualitative assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the DEP project and the factors that affected project performance. It used a triangulation

[16] Ibid, p34

methodology and mixed methods of analysis to draw conclusions and make recommendations based on stakeholder perceptions and the information available. In particular it:

- Collected information and perceptions of DEP through interviews with UNDP, UN Women, UNESCO, DEP project staff and consultants, development partners, the NEC and ZEC, ORPP, judiciary, political parties, CSOs and others. The interviews were held in Dar-Es-Salam and in Zanzibar. Additional interviews for persons in other locations were done by Skype, phone and email (Annex 1);
- Reviewed DEP project documents and other relevant documentation on the project, and electoral and political processes in Tanzania (Annex 2); and,
- Validated information through the interviews and document reviews as well as through the use of additional data sources and third party interviews.

The methodology for the evaluation is provided in the Evaluation Inception Report (Annex 3). The evaluation was limited by the time available for the review and write up, and the availability of project partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries for interviews. Some of the individual component evaluations had also not yet started and/or been completed, in particular those for the UN Women and UNESCO components, which could have contributed more specific results and performance data for this project evaluation.

The evaluation team produced this draft Evaluation Report. The evaluation findings are organized around the five anticipated outputs for the DEP project, and include issues of project design and implementation. This report uses the revised results framework to frame its findings, but the report also references the original framework where appropriate. The report's discussions cover both areas (mainland of Tanzania and islands of Zanzibar) unless specifically noted in the text. Lessons learned and best practices are identified within the discussions for each component. The evaluation report closes with the evaluation's conclusions and recommendations.

2. FINDINGS

2.1.Component 1: Support for legal and institutional reform

The objective for Component 1 was to support *legal and institutional reforms for credible elections* and improve the democratic environment in the country by strengthening the ability of key institutions (EMBs, ORPP and political parties) *to fulfil their function as catalysts for democratic consolidation in the country.* DEP intended to do this by supporting these institutions to contribute to the reform process and operationalizing reforms after they were adopted. Component 1 originally had one output: *legal and institutional reforms introduced to promote democratic elections* and was allocated USD 1,100,000 (5 percent of total project budget). The revised results framework split Component 2 into two outputs: 1) *Legal and institutional polices and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections;* and 2) *Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate peaceful resolution of electoral disputes.* Most of the same activities were carried over except for the support for research and dialogue on two decades of the multiparty system in Tanzania which was dropped. During implementation, the budget for Component 1 was increased to USD 3,254,222 (14 percent of project budget). As of August 2016, USD 2,720,398 had been expended.

Table 2: Letters of Agreement for Component 1

Agency	Date	Purpose	Amount USD
NEC	2/2014	Legal and institutional framework	70,000
ZEC	4/2014	Review laws	49,600
ORPP	4/2014	Constitutional review process, political party dispute resolution mechanism	229,909
ORPP	7/2015	Additional funding	341,500
		Total ORPP	***571,409***
		Total Component 1	***691,009***

The main partners for Component 1 were the NEC, ZEC, ORPP and the judiciary. DEP Support was provided through a combination of technical assistance and training organized by UNDP and UN Women as well as through Letters of Agreement (LOA) with the NEC, ZEC, and ORPP to fund specific components (Table 2).[17]

A key factor that affected the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability for Component 1 activities was the fact that the anticipated constitutional referendum was not held. Although this was beyond the control of a technical support project such as DEP and was unforeseen by most actors, including the EMBs, the project did not have an early warning system integrated into its efforts that might have alerted it earlier to this possibility and enabled it to adjust approach and programming; much of which had been designed on the assumption of a referendum and reforms in 2014. Nevertheless, DEP support to the ORPP and EMBs to engage stakeholders in the process of legal and institutional reforms was useful to expand the outreach of these institutions, provide feedback to them on the need for reforms, and strengthen the consultative processes around reforms. Their inputs, and in particular those of gender equity, were adopted (some promoted by UN Women through synergistic programming with their DEP work), and can be expected to inform any future versions of those documents. Participants told the evaluators that they would guard the gains made in these efforts and use them to promote even more reforms.

The NEC and ZEC both said they are currently reviewing the electoral laws as part of their review of the 2015 process. In this they are also using the findings of the observer reports. The NEC asked for support for workshops with state attorneys to discuss areas of the law that need to be improved. Both EMBs are looking for training on the electoral laws for their staff and stakeholders to improve their compliance to the laws as well as to reduce the number of irregularities and complaints received.

2.1.1. Output 1.1: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections

The objective for Output 1.1 was to *reform legal and institutional policies and systems to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections.* DEP intended to do this through the provision of technical assistance, training and facilitation to the EMBs and ORPP in several areas. This included support to EMBs to *revise the guidelines and regulations to support inclusive and credible elections, review of the Zanzibar referendum law, reform of key electoral laws to facilitate the active engagement of women, youth and Persons with Disabilities (PWD) in the electoral processes,* and *enhance political parties' capacity to engage in electoral processes.* The planned activity to the ORPP to *support the constitutional review process in an inclusive manner* was cancelled.

Most of the activities undertaken with the EMBs to strengthen their institutional plans and policies are discussed in Section 2.2. The findings in that section note that these activities did strengthen plans and documents and in particular in regards to their inclusivity and gender mainstreaming. There was also anecdotal evidence of wider stakeholder engagement and information sharing by EMBs because of DEP support for meetings and legal/policy reviews.

The LOA provided to the ZEC supported its review of the 2010 Referendum Act and other election laws and regulations. The LOA for the NEC was to support its review of the election laws and regulations to ensure alignment with the 2014 Referendum Act. These reforms were subject to the adoption of the new constitution which did not occur. There is still an important need for institutional and electoral reforms, especially for the independence of the EMBs as illustrated in the case of Zanzibar and for other issues as noted by observers.[18]

[17] Note: The LOAs for the legal activities in the NEC and ZEC in Table 2 also included elements for institutional planning which are listed in listed in Table 3.

[18] TEMCO, *2015 General Election Report*, p 49

The LOA for the ORPP allowed it to also participate in the process and expand its consultations with parties and others. According to the Midterm Evaluation Report, DEP was able to develop a "*productive partnership*" between the EMBs and ORPP that allowed political parties, civil society, women's groups and others to provide input into the review of some of the election-related legal and policy documents. This included the Electoral Act, the Political Parties Act and the Election Expenses Act. DEP through UN Women worked closely with the ORPP to ensure gender and inclusion issues were mainstreamed in these acts and in the amended political parties' code of conduct. As the legislative work was not adopted by the outgoing parliament, a review of the drafts, follow-up and advocacy will be needed to get them tabled and adopted.

UN Women also supported the ORPP to establish the Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policy by providing funding and technical assistance. The objective of the policy is to "*promote multiparty democracy through addressing gender equality and social inclusion in processes by promoting values as well as mechanisms, procedures and strategies that respond to the specific needs of politically marginalized groups*".[19] Through DEP, UN Women supported the Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD) to do a gender analysis of political parties' constitutions and manifestos and develop recommendations for inclusive nomination procedures. This was done with a consultant recruited by TCD, with the advice of a task force made up of the ORPP, TCD, the Women's Elections Coalition and UN Women. It is not clear whether the political parties applied the reviewed nomination guidelines for their 2015 nominations. Project reporting indicates that all 22 political parties adopted the code of conduct.

This output also supported collaborative leadership and dialogue workshops through the ORPP to provide safe spaces for dialogue. Five separate workshops were held for secretary generals and chairpersons of parties, TWPC, youth representatives and for ORPP staff. Although this was a good start at engaging parties to find ways to collaborate and resolve their differences, it is not possible to transform the "*zero-sum, winner-take-mentality by developing a strong understanding of shared political interests" or to develop "consensus among the leaders on the rules of the game that ensure inclusivity and local ownership*" in one or two workshops and without continuing follow up. The absence of the ruling party for the party workshop also raised suspicions among participants about their absence and was a lost opportunity for all of the parties to have worked together on selected issues. The lesson learned from that workshop was the need for "*extensive consultations and full political backing prior to the workshop (as) who attends is as important as the content, design and facilitation of the workshop*."[20] The women party members saw their workshop as an opportunity to work with the ORPP and raise key issues related to women in politics, including representation and violence against women.

According to project reporting, training was also provided to about 2,300 political party polling agents. It was evident from observer reports that most of the parties' structures are weak and that the persons who serve as poll watchers, among other party members, still need significant strengthening.

2.1.2. Output 1.2: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes

This output intended to support the *reform of legal and institutional policies and systems to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes.* DEP intended to do this through fostering electoral justice through improved electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; specifically, *strengthening the capacity of the judiciary in handling electoral related disputes* and *strengthening the capacity of political parties to resolve inter and intra-party disputes.* DEP intended to do this through technical

[19] United Republic of Tanzania, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, *Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policy*, 2016 p. 11

[20] DEP, *Collaborative Leadership and Dialogue Workshops Reflective Report*, pps 3 and 6

support, training and limited commodity support to the ORPP to establish a Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM). It also intended to train judges, registrars, magistrates and state attorneys on election petitions.

One of the issues noted in the 2010 elections was the slow adjudication of electoral cases in the courts. In 2011, the ESP had provided a two day seminar for judges on handling electoral petitions which the participants thought was too little, too late in the process. In 2015, DEP provided an awareness training to the judges from the court of appeals and high court. The judges thought this effort could be made more relevant if done as a practical training on how to process electoral petitions in Tanzania rather than as a general sensitization on electoral dispute resolution (remembered as "*speeches*"). This notion was picked up by one of the participants, who at the time was a Director in the Institute of Judicial Administration Training, who felt that the training of judges needed to combine knowledge on substantive and procedural laws with judicial skills on how to handle cases and a better understanding of the public interest and public policy. He approached UNDP about funding this type of hands-on course. DEP agreed and they developed what appears to have been a very effective partnership to develop and deliver this component and for which there were visible results. In 2010, the electoral petitions were not resolved until 2012. In 2015, out of the 53 petitions in the high court for parliamentary offices, most were resolved within six months. Three are still pending and two of them were expected to be before the end of November 2016. For counsellor offices, the courts received 198 petitions. About 100 of these were finalized within three months. The legal time limit for their resolution is 18 months. The judges want to repeat the course starting in 2018 and expand it to include the lawyers who file the election petitions since they are another key actor in the chain of electoral complaint resolution.

The development of this course was a best practice and one that should be replicated in future projects. Among some of the factors:

- it was driven and shaped by the judiciary themselves, with facilitation provided by DEP;
- it extended the training to the other actors involved in the adjudication of electoral petitions (magistrates, court registrars) and used a TOT approach to reach more persons; it included the judges in Zanzibar including the Chief Justice;
- it provided the opportunity for the judges to interact, share experiences and forge a common understanding on how to best address election petitions and appeals through practical work, homework and by providing them with hard copies of the relevant laws for their reference during their actual court work; and,
- it was done in a timely manner and was completed before the election results were announced and any election petition complaints were lodged.

The ORPP was also an interested partner in DEP activities, characterizing DEP support as "*very, very important*." It credits DEP with allowing it to have stakeholder workshops and forums that helped to bridge gaps and build trust between the different stakeholders. The ORPP also found the project useful as a means to raise issues and effect change in political parties. This year the ORPP will issue a report on 2015 electoral finance. This is the first time that this office will issue a report, and the Registrar can use this in his work with parties to raise awareness and compliance issues with the political parties on the electoral finance regulations. DEP also facilitated the ORPP to increase public awareness on its work and the Election Expenses Act 2015. The ORPP arranged for messages through the broadcast media and workshops with the network of community radio broadcasters. These are first steps towards increasing the accountability of parties for reporting on their election funding and its use. This should help to increase the transparency of the processes, allow for improved monitoring by civil society and ultimately to the strengthening of those regulations.

Parties are reportedly interested in collaborating with the ORPP according to interviews, as they think the ORPP can provide them with capacity building opportunities, such as leadership training, how to do a manifesto, comply with reporting requirements, etc. DEP did support ORPP-party

workshops to develop a political parties' dispute resolution mechanism for use in addressing conflicts among parties. The inter-party disputes resolution uses a conflict resolution model including dialogue and ORPP mediation. The mechanism for intra-party disputes requires legislative amendments and were integrated into the Amended Political Parties Act after approval of the Political Parties Council.[21]

The DEP project also worked to strengthen the institutional capacity of the ORPP to better fulfil its role. It provided a consultant that undertook a needs assessment and helped with the development of its first strategic plan (2017 - 2022) which is awaiting final approvals.[22] DEP also provided some ICT equipment, cabling and training to facilitate the ORPP's work. The ORPP provides a good entry point for some of the political party assistance as it engages with all political parties, not just the parties in parliament which is TCD's mandate. It also sees itself as a bridge between the parties and the government. It is well situated to play an important role in strengthening the integrity and credibility of the processes and is looking for DEP-type support for the future.

2.2. Component 2: EMBs supported to improve integrity of planning and operations and overall management capacity

The objective for Component 2 was to strengthen EMB capacity to improve their "*independence, credibility, professionalism, efficiency and accountability*." DEP intended to do this through the strengthening of the EMBs capacity to "*effectively deliver their core mandates*."[23] Component 2 had six outputs in the Project Document and was allocated more than half the project's funding (USD 13,170,000). This amount was eventually reduced to USD 9,602,771 (42 percent of total project budget) of which USD 8,775,637 had been expended as of August 2016. The revised results framework clustered the original six output activity areas around two main outputs: 1) *the EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks to support holding of credible elections;* and, 2) the *EMBs systems and procedures to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections*.

The main partners for Component 2 were the NEC and ZEC, along with participation by political parties, CSOs, the media and community radio. Assistance was provided through a combination of technical assistance, training and materials provided by DEP (UNDP, UN Women and UNESCO) as well as through LOAs directly with the EMBs that funded specific activities that each implemented themselves (Table 3).

Table 3: Letters of Agreement for Component 2

EMB	Date	Purpose	Amount USD
NEC	2/2014	Institutional capacity, planning,	345,000
NEC	11/2014	Data centre renovation	84,380
NEC	6/2015	Voter information campaign for voter registration	327,444
NEC	7/2015	Stakeholder dialogues	200,000
		TOTAL NEC	***956,824***
ZEC	12/2012	Upgrading and updating voter registry	481,115
ZEC	2/2014	Strategic and operational planning	215,000
ZEC	11/2014	HQ renovation and stakeholder meetings	211,320
ZEC	6/2015	Voter information campaign	90,819
ZEC	7/2015	Stakeholder dialogues	126,495
		TOTAL ZEC	***1,124,749***
		TOTAL EMBS	***2,081,573***

There were several factors that affected the overall relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the Component 2 activities and results. Some of these were design or systemic issues that also affected other elements of the project. These included:

- ***level of EMBs interest in the different activities and types of assistance provided.*** Where there was a high level of interest, the EMBs made good use of the project and what it could

[21] DEP 2016 *2nd Quarter Report*, p. 6
[22] ORPP, *Draft Report, UNDP Democratic Empower Project Implementation Report*, p 6
[23] DEP, *Project Document*, p 21

offer and had substantive results. Where there was not, EMB engagement was passive or postponed. The results for those efforts are most likely found at the activity level (i.e.: it was done and some persons participated). For Component 2, this factor directly affected the nature and scope for technical assistance and limited the ability of the project to address the more normative issues of the electoral process, such as institutional transparency and accountability.

- ***parcelled nature of activities between outputs and among implementers.*** Some basic EMB functions to be supported were split and parcelled off between Components 1 and 2 and within Component 2 For example, EMBs *capacity to plan* was split from its *capacity to conduct credible electoral processes*. Activities to support EMB professional development and voter information were split between Component 2 outputs. This artificially divided what should be a cohesive and programmatic effort targeted at achieving the higher level results (improved integrity and electoral management) and brought it down to the activity level (completing the activities). Activities were also parcelled off between UNDP, UN Women and UNESCO who did not sit and work as one integrated team. Coordination was through a weekly meeting and individual discussions. This was mitigated for the gender aspects to some extent by the experience of the gender team (hired by UN Women) who made efforts to ground the EMB gender mainstreaming and inclusion work within the work of the larger team.
- ***nature of the technical assistance provided.*** DEP took a capacity building approach to EMB support which included the embedding of long term technical assistance in the EMBs led by a CTA who would report to the Resident Coordinator. The need and receptivity for this type of TA were not adequately factored into the discussions during the design phase and subsequent project document or there would not have been the continuing issues with the NEC throughout the project about the nature of the assistance.[24] The quality of TA also varied, with some experts making more substantive and valued contributions to the EMBs than others.
- ***level of project focus on the normative aspects of free, fair and credible elections.*** The project was successful at promoting the objective of more inclusive participation because it was a major element of the project design and was pursued aggressively in project implementation. The same level of focus and integration of efforts were not as evident for some of the other normative aspects of the process, such as EMB independence and the quality of the processes (freeness and fairness). Supporting national institutions and stakeholders to address these challenges and strengthen their processes gives electoral cycle projects their purpose.[25]

2.2.1. Output 2.1: EMBs planning, management, execution of key tasks enhanced to support holding of credible elections

The objective for Output 2.1 was to *enhance EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks to strengthen the holding of credible elections.* It also expected to *facilitate the engagement of women, youth and PWDs in the electoral process* through support for more inclusive business polices and processes by the EMBs. DEP expected to accomplish this through the provision of technical assistance, training and facilitation. Intended activities included strengthening the EMBs' planning, management and monitoring and M&E capacity; undertaking a feasibility study to facilitate NEC decentralization; and, helping to ensure targeted voter education material focusing on women,

[24] The model adopted of a large long term technical assistance team led by a CTA that reports directly to the Resident Coordinator is used most often in cases where the international community is providing significant levels of technical and financial assistance to help the country hold the electoral event, such as in peacekeeping or transitional election contexts.
[25] UNDP, *Thematic Evaluation of UNDP's Contribution to Electoral Systems and Processes*, p iii

youth and PWD were delivered in hard to reach areas and marginalized communities. Most of the Output 2.1 activities were undertaken with the exception of the decentralization feasibility study which the NEC asked to postpone for timing reasons and the post-election M&E work according to project reporting.

The project provided several long term technical experts to work on both outputs for Component 2 headed by a CTA. This included three electoral advisors/specialists and two ICT experts hired by UNDP; and, one election specialist on gender and social inclusion, one gender mainstreaming specialists and two inclusion analysts hired by UN Women. They were supplemented by short term experts (including for ICT, EMB management and logistics, etc). Some of these experts stayed for six months or more. The project design anticipated that the CTA and other long term technical staff would work within the EMBs to provide mentoring and expertise and support implementation of the project activities with them for the duration of the project. As noted, this effort was problematic and the degree of receptivity for this type of assistance was low though the ZEC did accept a long-term technical advisor who worked in their offices. Although the ZEC appreciated certain aspects of this assistance more than others, they made the best use of it where they found it the most relevant and useful. The NEC did not accept this although the official reasons were its lack of space. The personalities and approaches of the individual experts appeared to be factors in the level of EMB acceptance, however, the institutional culture of the NEC was not adequately factored into the design. The project did try to adapt to the circumstances, placing most of the experts in a rented project office near the NEC. However, this did not address the root cause of the issue, and the TA spent an inordinate amount of time trying to engage the NEC in areas where it was not interested.

The DEP supported the NEC through two different administrations as the director and some of the senior officers were changed before the 2015 elections. According to interviews, the first NEC was interested in the trainings (but less so in their follow ups) and in the commodity and financial support possibilities the project could provide. Their replacements were long-term NEC staff that were more open for technical support, some of which were able to benefit significantly from DEP assistance. However, in general, more substantive work in some areas was not possible because the NEC's institutional culture is protective of its mandate and is less open for assistance in some of the more sensitive areas of the process.

The ZEC was an engaged partner. However DEP assistance to the ZEC was suspended in 2015 following the ZEC Commission's nullification of the election results. The European Union (EU), African Union, Southern Africa Development Community and Commonwealth observer missions issued a joint statement "*expressing great concern over the decision to nullify the results*" and on the lack of evidence provided to justify the decision.[26] The decision to annul the elections was political. This situation, and that of the NEC's, illustrate the limitations of technical assistance programs working in a highly politicized and polarized context, and the need for parallel policy-level support for the technical recommendations made by projects and observers by the Heads of Missions and the UN Resident Coordinator throughout the electoral process, and on the demand side by civil society advocacy to improve the enabling environment for free and fair elections. There also needs to be a political commitment for the technical and policy support, without which the impact of such assistance is limited.

One of the objectives for Output 2.1 was *improving EMB strategic planning and policy making capacities.* It is likely that this objective was achieved although the degree that it improved is unknown without more project-specific performance data. DEP assistance provided the means and expertise that were used by the EMBs to develop and/or update some of their core documents such as their operational plans, electoral calendars, stakeholder engagement strategies, and institutional capacity assessments. One of the main achievements of the project was ZEC's development of a Gender and Social Inclusion Policy which includes identifying one of the staff as the ZEC Focal Point

[26] EU *EOM report*, pp 8 - 9

for Gender and Social Inclusion. It is unlikely this would have been done without the project's emphasis on inclusion and its technical and financial support. This effort was noted by the Government of Zanzibar which has discussed with ZEC the possibility of adopting this policy across government institutions in Zanzibar. The NEC declined to do a separate policy for gender and inclusion saying there was already a government policy in place.

The project supported the updating of the capacity needs assessments (CNAs) for both institutions which seemed relevant and useful. Previous CNAs were largely externally facilitated and both EMBs wanted to manage the CNA process this time around. The LOAs provided the financial means for them to do this and DEP provided the expertise by hiring three external consultants to help the NEC and ZEC to map out the process and write up the reports. Although the CNA's were done late in a project that focused on capacity building, they provided a useful tool that could be used to develop other EMB plans, including the ZEC's strategic plan for 2015 - 2019.

The ZEC CNA in particular is an extremely useful document that took a comprehensive look at the institution and surveyed its staff. The results of this survey not only can provide baseline data to help measure impact level results for the future; it also provided a very solid foundation for ZEC's institutional planning and development. The NEC report is more general in its analysis but has a series of specific recommendations for improvement that should prove to be useful for the future. The extent to which the CNAs and action plans for improvements were then used to target trainings and select appropriate participants is unclear as it was not tracked, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this is an area that needs more focus in the future.

DEP technical support to strengthen the EMBs M&E efforts appears to have been limited to one sensitization at the ZEC as aid was suspended afterwards and the NEC did not participate. Both institutions received funding through LOAs for activities that included the development of their M&E systems for the electoral process. Although this was done in 2014, both EMBs completed their own post-election evaluations in 2016. The NEC's includes a stakeholder survey of almost 2,000 persons in addition to its own assessment of the process. The NEC planning department asked for capacity building for M&E for the elections during the evaluation interviews. The ZEC is also planning to establish a research and development department to do research on the electoral and political processes and wants to undertake its own surveys for planning purposes. These are interesting areas for future electoral and political processes (EPP) assistance.

It is difficult without better project performance data to assess the level of EMB improvements from 2013 to the present or to attribute any of these improvements to DEP or other assistance efforts. The EMBs use the electoral cycle approach in their planning and analysis; they have embraced BRIDGE as a professional development tool and have demonstrated capacity to deliver elections that are accepted by national and international observers. These are all elements that are promoted by UNDP electoral assistance projects and are likely the result of the accumulated information and capacities provided by DEP and the projects before it. [27] Challenges still remain in the transparency of their decision making processes, and the ability of stakeholders to scrutinize all of the EMBs activities.[28] The ZEC felt that the project assistance had helped their institutional development considerably, and noted in particular the benefits of continuing the assistance from one electoral cycle to another, and in particular for the training of its staff.

2.2.2. Output 2.2: EMB systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections

The objective for Output 2.2 was to *enhance EMB systems and procedures to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections.* DEP intended to accomplish this through the provision

[27] Observers of the 2015 general elections noted that both EMBs had "*sufficient levels of preparedness for the administration of the electoral process and in conducting key operation*…"EU Election Observation Mission, *Tanzania, General Elections 2015,* p6

[28] Ibid.

of technical assistance, training and facilitation in several areas. Some of these activities cross-cut those in Output 2.1 and are reported on under that output. Areas in Output 2.2 in the revised framework included supporting EMBs to hold stakeholder forums to increase their outreach and transparency; building *EMB staff capacity to apply ICT in their roles within the electoral cycle (*software development, training and commodity assistance for voter registration, candidate registration and results transmission); assisting the NEC to purchase biometric technologies for voter registration and undertaking an audit to help the EMBs *establish a credible voter registry.* DEP also intended to *strengthen EMB staff's professional capacity* through BRIDGE trainings and exchange visits; assess the public understanding of democratic values through surveys; and, *strengthen the capacity of community radios to report on elections and political issues in a non-partisan and inclusive manner* through training, mentoring and the development of community radio programming. Finally, it intended to strengthen the EMB engagement with observers by updating codes of conduct, developing an accreditation system and establishing observer information centres.

Most of the Output 2.2 activities were undertaken with the exception of the voter registry audit and the surveys which the NEC did not feel were needed at the time according to project reporting. The same technical expert team from DEP supported Output 2.2, supplemented by several long and short term ICT experts. UNESCO managed the community radio aspects and the inclusion and gender advisors from UN Women provided cross cutting advice for the elements focused on more inclusive participation.

ICT. The project provided a substantial level of ICT assistance in the form of technical assistance, software development, commodity support, training and funding provided directly to the EMBs through LOAs. Electoral technology has become an integral element for modern elections administration that can make its work more efficient, standardized and reliable, but it also needs to be dependable, easy to use by the institution, secure and relevant to their needs and abilities. Otherwise, it can be expensive and unsustainable. Project performance in this area was uneven. Some of the assistance was extremely well done, appreciated and used by the EMBs, while other parts needed better grounding in, and participation, by the EMBs.

The funding and commodity support to improve the server rooms and equipment for both EMBs was needed and appreciated. For the NEC this was essential to the adoption of the biometric voter registry (BVR). For the ZEC this provided a back up for the voter registry which was essential to maintain the integrity of the registry. However, the ZEC reported that a good number of the laptops provided by the project to ZEC's district level offices were non-functional within the year, and that the printers provided to print the voter registration cards did not meet their specifications for the task, and in fact the ZEC used its own funds afterwards to procure two much more substantial printers which it used instead.[29]

One of the project's major investments was the development of an electoral management system (EMS) for both EMBs. This was made up of four systems: Administrative Management System (AMS), Results Management System (RMS), Observer Management Systems (OMS) and the Candidate Management System (CMS). UNDP hired two programmers for this task who were assisted by other ICT experts and the CTA. The system was developed and tested, however only portions of it were actually used for the elections. The candidate system was not ready in time for candidate registration so the data was uploaded afterwards so it could feed into the results system, which was ultimately not used. For the 2015 elections, both EMBs relied on their existing software systems to manage the election results.

UNDP, DEP staff, development partners, EMBs and others had their own perspectives on the EMS development and why the system did not work as intended and/or was not used. It is likely a combination of all of these factors. The work started late and the intention was to develop project

[29] According to DEP staff, the ZEC signed off on the original procurement and must have changed its specifications later.

specific software rather than buy an existing EMS system off of the shelf and adapt it. This becomes a labour and time consuming process. Much of this work was done outside of the EMBs until late in its development. The EMBs felt they did have the opportunity to provide adequate input during its development and were shown the system when it was almost completed. Some in the DEP project felt they had used the specifications provided by the EMBs, and in particular for the NEC, and had a consultative process with key EMB staff, but staff and specification changes made the process of developing the software problematic. The project placed two developers in the ZEC to support the EMS' deployment and trained 250 NEC and 13 ZEC facilitators on its use before the elections. The end result was that the systems were delivered and tested at such a late point in the process[30] that, in the case of the NEC, it would not have been possible to fix all of the issues before the elections were held and train all of the users to a point where they could be assured of a smooth operation and valid data.[31] At this point, according to DEP, the project and the NEC jointly decided to use the 2010 EMS developed under ESP and modified by the NEC for use in the 2015 elections. This was very late in the process.

An ICT capacity needs assessment was done for the ZEC in July/August 2015. It found that the OMS, AMS and CMS worked well in both EMBs, and that the NEC used the observer management system at its Elections Results Centre to print observer credentials. According to the ZEC, it wanted a web-based system where observers could register ahead of time so the credentials could be ready for the observers when they arrived at its offices, but it felt the system did not allow for this. Those within the project said the system would have done this. The NEC, on the other hand, wanted the observers to apply in person so was satisfied with the system. Although the NEC noted for 2020, the programmers needed to add more functionality and provide a source code for it to be made available on line. According to the summary of observer reports produced by DEP, the accreditation of local observers went well although it started several days late in Dar es Salaam because of delays in the delivery of equipment and initial problems with the software system developed by DEP.[32] The DFID annual review of its programme, which provided funding to DEP, felt the accreditation process went smoothly and made a valuable contribution as the accreditation allowed observers entry into the needed locations, with the exception of the central tally room in Dar es Salaam.[33] The NEC policy to bar observers from that tally room also highlights the need for advocacy elements to be incorporated into electoral assistance programmes and for synergistic efforts by agency heads at the policy levels with the project.

The project also supported ICT training of all NEC staff in basic word and for ICT staff more advanced and ICT specific training. The DEP M&E plan included a target of 80 percent of staff trained express high confidence in applying ICT in their work.[34] It reports that over 90 percent of those trained highlighted increased skills and confidence in the use of ICT. Increasing the computer skills of an institution is relevant and essential for EMBs in this computer era, but no distinction was made between trainees and their level of skills with the level of the courses (basic word and excel) which reduced its relevance. The IT specific courses selected for the NEC ICT staff were more appropriate for their level and specific ICT needs.

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[30] DEP financed an external security audit of the EMS by a Norwegian IT firm at the request of the EMBs. This was done from 24 August - mid September 2015. It found 67 vulnerabilities considered to be significant for the NEC audit of which 67 percent were rated as high risk, 31 percent as medium risk and 2 percent as low risk (with similar results for the ZEC). They concluded that that there was '*inadequate security design with EMS application and its configurations and therefore recommended remediation*" before its use for both institutions and that the "*current architecture and its configurations for NEC is insufficient for the system security and availability during election period*." (NRD, NEC Security Audit Report, pps 7-9).

[31] Maphephe, *Review of Elections Management Systems, Final Mission Report*, p 5

[32] Anderson*, Summary of the Observer Reports, Observer Statements and Associated Documentation for the Tanzanian Elections*, p 6

[33] DFID, *Annual Review-Institutions of Democratic Empowerment and Accountability*, p 11

[34] DEP *2015 Annual Report*

Assessing the value of the DEP project for its ICT assistance is difficult. Despite the failure of the RMS, the computer literacy of the EMB staff has increased and both EMBs have improved ICT capacities through the improvements to their server rooms, equipment and some programmes. Both EMBs have the EMS systems and equipment in place. One of the first tasks of any subsequent project should be to determine the level of interest and commitment of both EMBs in continuing with the EMS system, and the cost-benefits of continuing to develop this system for use in the 2020 electoral process. This process needs to be driven by the EMB themselves to be useful and to ensure relevance and sustainability. This should also be a prerequisite for any ICT elements supported in the future. The lesson for future projects is to get a second opinion from an independent expert on the need to develop ICT software systems from scratch and the cost-benefits of the different options that are available to EMBs for these systems before an investment decision is made.

Voter Registration Support. The DEP provided technical support, commodities, training and funding to *support the EMBs to operationalize biometric voter registration technology* and to develop a *credible voter registry.* The NEC undertook a new biometric registration of the entire mainland population and for those in Zanzibar without a Zanzibar voter card, while the ZEC updated its existing registry. The ZEC received an LOA of USD 458,205 in December 2012 for maintenance of the upgraded voter registration system and to help update the registry, including some costs for operations and voter education. DEP provided servers and universal power sources for the ZEC and provided an LOA in November 2014 to the NEC to renovate and re-cable its server room. These were to provide a safe and appropriate place for the servers that maintained the voter registry data. DEP also provided an Assets Management System for EMBs use to track these and other assets.

DEP directly supported the NEC's BVR effort by providing short term TA to help develop the BVR's operational and logistic plans as well as a substantial number of computers, webcams and printers to facilitate the uploading of BVR data from the BVR kits to the central system via the internet. It also supported the training of the 650 NEC staff and 15,000 BVR kit operations and funded a NEC visit to one of the software suppliers in South Africa.[35]

The NEC registered 96 percent of the estimated eligible voters although observers noted some confusion caused by the changes of boundaries and the lack of a public information campaign to explain the BVR and concurrent ward boundary delimitation. [36] The NEC did not agree to the planned audit of the registry citing timing issues, however, this is likely a policy-level issue. The voter registration issue for Zanzibar is a political one rather than technical as it limits voters to those with a Zanzibar identity card and a 36 month residency certificate which observers found as "*overly restrictive*" and which the opposition alleges prevents its supporters from registering.[37] One of the DEP indicators was the number of multiple registration cases resolved. According to observer reports, the ZEC removed 7,751 voters from its list of 503,860 voters for various reasons, including deceased voters and double entries, while the NEC removed 1,031,266 entries with 181,452 identified as double entries (out of 22,751,292 entries).[38] However, this data is not useful from a performance perspective without an audit to see how many duplicates or ineligible voters were on the list before the effort or that remained afterwards. The best indicator seems to be that observers noted that the parties and voters were largely satisfied with the voter registration process and that it was done within the timelines.

Stakeholder Meetings. To *increase participation of key stakeholders in key aspects of the electoral process*, the project provided funding to the NEC (USD 200,000) and ZEC (USD 126,459) for a series of pre- and post-electoral workshops with political parties, media, CSOs and the project's target groups (women, youth and PWDs). These stakeholder meetings were also supported under ESP and

[35] DEP *Annual Report 2015*, p 14
[36] EUOM *2015 Report*, pps 19-20
[37] Ibid p. 20
[38] Ibid

helped to provide access and information to these groups which likely would not have happened as much or as in as systematic a manner without project funding. They also included PWD groups for the first time which was a direct result of the DEP focus. These meetings are not institutionalized within the two EMBs (for they say financial reasons), and one of the recommendations of the NEC's CNA was for it to institutionalize its stakeholder engagement.

Although participants perceived some meetings as proforma, this practice has become accepted by the EMBs and expected by the participating groups. This has helped to open and maintain space for dialogue, and helped to increase stakeholder understanding of the electoral processes. The NEC felt the dialogue in 2015 helped reduce the number of complaints that it received on the process. They also thought the inclusion of the media was a good element as this increased their reach. The sharing of information can help to avoid the misunderstandings that can lead to conflict and improve the quality of the processes and participation. There is still a continuing need for this outreach. The observers felt the measures taken by the NEC, including regular press releases, were "*insufficient to build confidence amongst political parties about the NEC's transparency. In Zanzibar, the lack of information provided to political parties regarding voter register and constituency boundaries also affected the confidence of political parties in the ZEC and in the electoral process*."[39] At the same time, there was a significant increase in voter turnout for 2015 (67 percent) from 2010 (43 percent).[40] Efforts supported by DEP contributed to that increased turnout, but the actual extent for this contribution is unknown because of the number of other factors that affect turnout.

BRIDGE. To support EMB professional development, DEP provided seven BRIDGE modules (USD 312,354) and 10 study tours/exchange visits. The BRIDGE modules selected[41] were relevant to the needs of the EMBs although the selection of the participants for some course needed more attention. As an example, the facilitators' reports note that for the post-electoral module for the NEC mixed senior staff with support staff that had completely different training needs and levels of expertise. Language was also an issue for some as the courses were conducted in English.[42]

Both EMBs thought the BRIDGE training and its methodologies were relevant to their needs and useful for staff development. Previous BRIDGE trainings had relied almost completely on external trainers. DEP sought to continue the BRIDGE training for EMB staff, but to also build a pool of trainers within both institutions that could enable the institutions to conduct their own BRIDGE trainings in the future. One Train-the Facilitators workshop was held (April-May 2014). This was late in the project for this purpose as participants must participate in and facilitate a certain number of workshops to become accredited. Two NEC staff were accredited and four ZEC staff are semi-accredited. One of the NEC facilitators has already left the institution, raising sustainability issues. As the NEC is comprised of government employees who can be transferred, it will have a continuing need for training. Finishing the accreditation of the remaining participants who were partially accredited in both institutions, and supporting the development of in-service training within the institutions, would help to solidify the gains made by the train-the facilitators' efforts.

DEP also arranged for six international "study tours", four within Tanzania, and hosted one visit from the electoral commission from Mexico. The focus was primarily on South to South exchanges. Without better performance data, the value of these efforts is also unknown. However, they appeared to have been organized for specific purposes linked to specific issues facing the EMBs and/or the objectives of the project. For instance, the CTA and three EMB members went to an international workshop in Jordan on EMBs and election credibility. Meeting international peers and discussing issues of electoral integrity is a good opportunity to reinforce the importance of

[39] Ibid, p 6
[40] Ibid, p 38
[41] Training for Commissioners; Train-the-Facilitator, Operations Planning and Electoral Management; Polling, Counting and Announcement of Results; Election Observation, Civic Education; and Voter Information and Post Election Activities.
[42] BRIDGE, *Final Report on Post-election Activities Module*, p 10

international integrity norms in their own EMBs and electoral processes. The visit to Nairobi focused on the Kenyan experience with their biometric systems for voter registration and polling. DEP also included officials from the National Identification Authority (NIDA) with the NEC in the trips to South Africa and to the UNDP Procurement Support Office in Copenhagen as the IT systems for voter registration and the national ID card are related. This has become especially pertinent since Tanzania wants to move to using the national ID card for voting for 2020 and they intend to use the NEC BVR kits for this purpose.

Voter education. There was a specific output (2.5) in the Project Document for *the Delivery of civic and voter education and information.* This included USD 1.2 million to "*support to NEC and ZEC in the establishment of small and medium grant scheme available to CSOs, CBOs, NGOs and associations to conduct voter education and public information activities on the deepening democracy values and principles."*[43] What exactly was intended is unclear as those working on DEP said the grant facility was intended for the NEC and ZEC to provide the bulk of the funds and to take control of the grant making and that the donors themselves would fund voter education bilaterally, while some of the development partners saw the grant facility was a part of the project and criticized DEP for not doing more for voter education. The NEC told the evaluators it had no intention of running a grant scheme for CSOs and the ZEC apparently told this as well to the DEP early on. DEP did provide LOAs to the EMBs in June 2015 (NEC USD 327,444; ZEC USD 90,819) to cover some airtime for TV, radio spots, newspaper advertisements and posters. Funding for the ZEC also included jingle production, road shows and seminars.

The issue of the EMBs managing grant funds is one that should have been clarified and resolved during the development of the DEP design. A decision was subsequently made for DEP to contract an organization for a limited voter education campaign. This process was problematic. An international firm won the tender but according to reports the NEC refused to accept the firm even though it was part of the procurement selection committee as it wanted a national firm to undertake the effort. A national firm was eventually contracted. The delays in contracting made the effort extremely late and some of those interviewed had doubts that everything in the voter information contract was implemented. This is an issue best handled by auditors. Observers reported that the voter education efforts were late and inadequate but noted the emphasis in the campaigns on women, youth and PWD which was the focus promoted by the project.

The project facilitated the EMBs to create voter education reference groups on the mainland and in Zanzibar which included civil society groups and the media. These were technical groups of about 20 persons who worked with the EMBs on message content and its dissemination. The NEC said 75 percent of its group's members were from outside of Dar es Salaam. Their intention was to bring in more groups from the areas with more limited access to information. The effectiveness of the effort with the NEC for the content of the messages was limited by its late start as much of its voter education material had already been prepared. The NEC is interested in expanding this effort, and would like to do mock elections as a voter education tool on live TV and radio. They are starting to implement a strategy to reach first time youth in secondary schools through NEC staff visits. This includes mock elections and is an area that might be interesting to explore for future programming. The ZEC felt its reference group was useful and it developed its own materials. There were efforts with community radio which included voter education messages which are covered in this report in Components 3 and 4.[44]

[43] DEP, *Project Document*, p 61

[44] Civic education is a pressing need for Tanzania. According to interviews, ESP developed a full curriculum in 2009 with the Ministry of Education which was never used. It would be a good idea to review this curriculum and see if it might be useful for future efforts.

2.3. Component 3. Support inclusive participation in electoral and political processes

The main objective for Component 3 was to address challenges that face women, youth and PWD to engage effectively in political and electoral processes. The component also aimed to create sustainable processes to empower and build capacities of marginalized groups for effective participation in politics and elections. There was one output intended in the original design which was to *enhance inclusive participation in political party structures and processes*. The project intended to do this through: supporting skills and capacity development for women, youth and PWD as potential candidates and party leaders; promoting public awareness on gender equality and women's empowerment through community dialogue at grass-root levels; as well as CSO-based campaigns and outdoor activities as part of voter education. It also intended to undertake a study to assess the effectiveness of the current constitutional framework including the electoral system on efforts to improve inclusive participation in politics and elections.

These activities were to be facilitated by all three UN agencies. Component 3 was allocated USD 1,500,000 (7 percent of total project budget). This was revised upward during the project to USD 2,936,942 (13 percent of project budget). As of August 2016 USD 3,100,757 had been expended.

The revised results framework separated the original output and activities into two outputs: 1) *Increased number of women, youth and PWDs seeking political party nominations in 2015 elections*; and, 2) *Targeted stakeholders (political officials, media and community based organizations) promote the participation of women, youth and PWDs in party leadership and nominations.* As with Component 2, the rationale for separating the output between increasing the number of aspirants and stakeholders promoting the participation of women, youth and PWD in parties is not evident to the evaluators at this point in time and seems to artificially separate what would usually be seen as an integrated effort. However, UN Women says this was done because they are different things and require different activities and approaches.

UN Women took the overall lead and responsibility for implementing Component 3, in coordination with UNESCO for the activities with community radio, and with the main DEP project team. UN Women provided four gender experts through DEP and complemented some of the DEP activities with funding it received directly. This allowed for a more comprehensive and programmatic effort than was foreseen in the original design. The main partners for Component 3 were the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Centre for Democracy, TWCP, Femina Hip, SHIVYAWATA, ORPP, the Tanzania Network Programme (TGNP), Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and community radios.

2.3.1. Output 3.1: Increased number of women, youth and PWD seeking political party nominations

The objective for Output 3.1 under the revised framework was to *increase the number of women, youth and PWD seeking political party nominations in the 2015 elections* by 10 percent. DEP intended to accomplish this through identifying potential aspirants in the target groups for elected office and increasing their capacity to engage in the electoral processes through training. UN Women collaborated with TWCP to develop a database of women, youth and PWD aspirants in close collaboration with political parties at the central and regional levels as well as with the parties' women's wings. Parties validated the database. They also developed training manuals for aspirants and candidates. UN Women supported TGNP Mtandao, LHRC, TAMWA – Zanzibar) and TWCP to carry out the trainings of aspirants geared mainly towards increasing their chances for intra-party nominations and positions of leadership during the 2015 general elections.[45] Tanzania has special seats for women in Parliament. These are allocated on a proportional basis on the results of the

[45] TGNP 2016. *Feedback report on trained aspirants (Women, PWDs, Youths) for the 2015 elections*, pp. 4-5

parties in the parliamentary elections. One of the objectives of the project was to increase the number of women directly competing for a seat as well as the confidence for women to vie for special seats.

The DEP design for this element incorporated the lesson from the 2010 project which was to ensure political parties were engaged in the process of identifying the potential candidates. However, putting this lesson into practice was time consuming and difficult. Although the first consultations for the mapping of potential aspirants took place in April 2014 with 21 political parties, the parties took time to deliver their lists and for the project to verify them. Only 19 parties ultimately submitted names.[46] By the time training was able to start the parties were already focused on preparing for the upcoming electoral campaigns.

Table 4: Letters of Agreement with UN Women and UNESCO

Agency	Date	Purpose	Amount USD
UN Women	10/2013	Increase participation women, youth, PWD, gender mainstreaming	1,979,840
	7/2015	Extended date to 6/16, added funds	250,000
	6/2016	No cost time extension to 31 October 2016	
		Total UN Women	***2,315,829.30***
UNESCO	12/2012	Promoting community media for women empowerment, civic education, democratic discourse and peace building	1,00497.08
	12/2014	Add activities for 2015 for inclusive participation, Time extension to June 2016	800,403
	8/2016	No cost time extension to 30 September 2016	106,999.92
		Total UNESCO	***1,907,900.08***

This mapping exercise also revealed the weakness of the parties which demonstrated different levels of difficulties in identifying potential candidates. Almost 10,000 names were submitted by December 2014, these were reduced to 1,925 verified candidates after those interested in local government positions, persons on more than one party list and relatives of party members were removed. The smaller parties were opportunistic, particularly for the opportunity for the per diem associated with the training and submitted several thousand names each. Most of these were women, with 701 youth, 105 PWDs of which five were men.[47] Although the number of potential aspirants exceeded the number expected to be trained, DEP planned to extend the training to all registered aspirants. However with the delays, only one of the organizations was able to deliver the training which reached about 70 percent of the aspirants (845 women, 360 youth and 77 PWDs).[48]

The effectiveness of the training was affected by its lateness and one-time nature although UN Women was able to extend the training from three to five days due to complementary funding obtained from other sources. According to the report on the pre- and post-tests for the aspirants, their knowledge and confidence increased in all regions but one (Morogoro) and from 4 percent (Kilimanjaro) to 32 percent (Mwanza) for the rest.[49] 58 percent said they were now very confident they could communicate clearly across different audiences, with only 4 percent not confident. However, getting a party nomination and running for office takes a combination of skills and knowledge, and transformations take time. The actual results for this effort may only be visible in 2020 and if there is follow up and mentoring for the aspirants between now and then. Training manuals could also help participants and provide reference for their post-training efforts.

The project also provided training to 713 candidates from all over Tanzania in October 2015 intending to build a strategic partnership among the candidates and build their leadership skills and understanding of the importance of their participation. Most of these were women (618) with only

[46] TWCP, *Report on the Mapping of Women, Youth, and Persons with Disabilities Aspiring to Contest in the Coming General Elections in Tanzania,* p 18
[47] Ibid, p 16
[48] DEP *Annual Report 2015*, p. 21
[49] LHRC, *Report on the analysis of the response collected from the aspirant's knowledge and confidence assessment conducted in nine regions of Tanzania Mainland*, pps 9 and 16

70 youth and 25 PWDs. [50] Political parties appeared to have more direct interest in the training of their candidates. For example, in Dar es Salaam only 139 out of the 300 candidates who showed up for training were from the target groups. These were mainly from the small parties and a low turnout was noted from the larger parties. In these trainings, trainers also noted the large differences in education and skill levels. For instance, 28 out of the 36 participants in Shinyanga had not completed elementary school. [51] The late date of the effort (two weeks before the election day) affected participant turnout and the ability for the participants to put their new information and skills to use in the campaign.

There was a significant increase in the number of women who ran for office in 2015 (239) from 2010 (193). Trainers attributed this increase to the trainings conducted as well as other factors. Actual data for the number of trained participants that ran as candidates was not available. However, a study on the feedback from aspirants that reached 723 out of the 1,282 trained aspirants indicates that out of 509 aspirants who took forms, 169 (33 percent) were eventually nominated by their respective political parties as candidates; 158 for councillors' positions and 11 for parliament. (about 25 percent of all reached aspirants took nomination forms).[52] However, only 25 women out of the 239 women candidates for parliament were elected in the 2015-2020 parliament.[53] There is no data available on the number of youth and PWDs who were either nominated or elected at the time of writing this report.

Women appeared to have been the main focus for these efforts, likely because some of the groups engaged in the effort are engaged in issues of women's rights. The youth wings were slow to respond to the project activities, and according to interviews by the time they submitted aspirants' names, it was too late in the process for them to be included. PWD were reached through Shivyawata, which has a significant network of PWDs, however, very few PWD aspirants participated. Other marginalized groups should also be considered for future efforts with the data base.

A remaining challenge is the male-oriented culture of the political parties. The male party members and leaders should be included in this type of training if they are to change their institutional culture and be constructive actors for gender and social inclusion. Their internal laws, regulations and procedures do not pay particular attention to women, youth or PWDs. Even worse, a post-election survey funded by DEP through UN Women on violence against women in elections indicates for instance that the main perpetrators of violence against women are male candidates, party supporters and party officials.[54]

2.3.2. Output 3.2: Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media, CBOs) promote participation of women, youth, PWD in party leadership and nomination

The objectives for Output 3.2 under the revised framework were to *increase the capacity of political party officials to promote gender and social inclusion in electoral processes; increase awareness of CBOs on gender and social inclusion with particular focus on women, youth and PWDs*; and *increase knowledge and skills of media practitioners (journalists) to report on electoral issues in a nonpartisan, ethical and inclusive manner.* UN Women collaborated with TCD; TGNP-LHRC; TWCP; Femina HIP, TAMWA and community radios to organize training for party leaders, CBOs, media and community radios on issues of gender equality and social inclusion.

[50] LHRC, *Training of Women, Youth and PWDs Candidates in the 2015 General Elections*, p 10
[51] Ibid, p 15
[52] TGNP, 2016 p. 12.
[53] DEP *Annual Report 2015*, p. 23.
[54] TWCP, *Report on violence against women in elections (VAWE): VAWE evidence from 2015 Tanzania general elections*, p. 27.

The TWCP and TCD used a TOT approach to reach party members at national and regional levels. According to interviews, the trainings were done but their effectiveness was limited for several factors.[55] This included a late start up for the training, the absence of key party leaders, and the lack of follow up to the trainings. By the time of the training, the parties' attention was already focused on the electoral campaign which was starting. As a result, the parties sent nominal participants to the trainings. In addition, the trainers felt that training at the district level would have been more effective as the parties have their main relationships with the EMBs, TPF and district officials at that level, although this would have also significantly increased the costs for the training. According to activity reporting, the workshops were appreciated by the participants but were beset by a number of challenges. This included the ambitious curriculum for the time frame and the differing levels of participant knowledge on the concepts. There were also conflicts in Ruvuma between participants from different political parties and "*ill feelings*" over the disparity in allowances provided to participants.

UN Women's partners conducted three-day trainings of community based organizations (CBOs) on gender and social inclusion in eight regions (Morogoro, Pwani, Mara, Simiyu, Shinyanga, Ruvuma, Geita, Mtwara, and Mbeya). Training was provided to 217 persons (95 women, 122 men). Participants were from CBOs representing youths, women, PWDs, religious groups, community media, and community leaders. The intention was to increase their awareness on the participation of women, youth and PWD in the electoral processes and political leadership, and for them to spread this awareness among their constituents. They drew up action plans using their regular forums to convey the training messages within their communities. Although the plans were developed without the anticipation of funding, trainers noted the difficulties for participants to implement these plans without resources.[56] According to the DEP Quarterly Report, a post-election assessment done by one of the training partners found that a majority of these participants said they implemented their action plans (58 percent) and that 68 percent of those used public meetings in open spaces, churches, mosques, and group meetings to reach out to their communities.[57] Media analysis undertaken by TAMWA also noted that about 61 percent of the religious leaders who attended training spoke positively in support of the roles and rights of women, youth and PWD. [58]

There is not enough data to make any correlations between these activities and results obtained by women, youth and PWD candidates in some areas, such as Manyara which is known for high levels of gender based violence and male dominated leadership. However, there remains a significant need for these types of awareness raising efforts and for civic education. Follow up with the CBOs by the project after the workshops and seed funding for activities could help to strengthen these types of efforts and promote more synergistic action with other project elements for the future.

Use of the media to raise awareness seems to have been an effective approach, with UNESCO through its community radios playing a significant role. According to project reporting, 28 community radios were supported with an estimated reach of 16 million listeners.[59] Although no audience data was available to the evaluators to confirm the actual reach of the programs supported by DEP, interviews in Zanzibar for instance indicate that many people listen to community radio and that the radios made efforts to promote social inclusion. They broadcast a broad range of programs on the inclusion of the marginalized groups and engaged representatives of women, youth and PWD in the production of these educational programs. In the absence of pre- and post-listener surveys there is no way to know the actual impact of these programmes, but it appears likely that they

[55] A total of 851 party leaders (326 women, 525 men) were trained. According to project reporting, 80 percent of these officials noted increased skills and knowledge to promote gender and social inclusion in electoral processes (per DEP 2015 Annual Report).

[56] LHRC- TGNP, *Compiled Field Reports of the Training of Stakeholders conducted In Mara, Ruvuma, Mtwara, Simiyu, Mbeya, Shinyanga, Morogoro and Pwani Regions.*

[57] DEP *2016 Quarter 1 Progress Report* p. 11

[58] UN Women, Component 3, *Annual Report 2015*, p 19

[59] DEP, Results and Indicator Framework

increased the awareness of listeners on some issues of social inclusion as well as on the other educational messages sent through the community radio network.

Femina Hip produced TV and radio messages on women and youth awareness, engaged women candidates with journalists to cover their issues and distributed leaflets on women, youth and PWD issues. Femina HIP also made good use of community radio to promote inclusion in political and electoral processes while TAMWA relied on ITV and Radio. They also engaged journalists in the training and sensitization efforts. In Zanzibar, 114 journalists from electronic and print media from 40 media houses were trained. Similarly, 100 media practitioners were trained on the challenges confronting PWDs that prevent them from effectively participating in leadership positions. The evaluators heard of anecdotal evidence of increased media interest and coverage on women's participation and that of youth and PWD among those who participated in trainings. The community radios interviewed in Zanzibar felt their programs on inclusion politics raised the awareness of their listeners on the rights of marginalized groups. The main challenge was that most of the assistance came late in the electoral cycle.

2.4. Component 4. Support national peace infrastructure to mitigate and resolve election-related conflict

The objective for Component 2 was to *support Tanzania's national peace infrastructure* which is the cooperative and synergistic efforts made between the police, EMBs, political parties, local governments, civil society and others *to prevent and manage conflict before it escalates*. This sought to resume efforts started in previous elections and expand it to help ensure a peaceful electoral process for 2015. DEP intended to do this through strengthening the police's capacity to provide appropriate levels of electoral security and reduce incidents of excessive use of force, and by establishing multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms for regular engagement and collaboration among electoral stakeholders on electoral security issues. Component 4 had one output in the Project Document and was allocated USD 2,230,000 (10 percent of the total project budget). This was revised upwards during the project to USD 3,473,573 (15 percent of project budget). As of August 2016 USD 2,600,768 had been expended.

Table 5: Letters of Agreement for Component 4

Agency	Date	Purpose	Amount USD
TPF	6/2015	Training for senior and mid-level TPF officers	441,693
TPF	9/2015	Training on human rights, gender, role TPF	399518
TPF	9/2015	Additional funding for human rights, gender, role training	127,964
TPF	9/2015	IRRS installation and training	77,778
		TOTAL TPF	***1,046,953***
OMZ	7/15	Dialogues for peace	208,055
		Total OMZ	***208,055***

The revised results framework split the original output into two: 1) *Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (National Police) to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events;* and 2) *Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections.* The main partners for Component 4 were the National Police and its dialogue with the other stakeholders. This was expanded during implementation to engage more youth in the process. Assistance was provided through a combination of technical assistance, training, commodities and facilitation provided by UNDP/UN Women with UNESCO community radio participating as one of the actors and communication tools. This was complemented with funding provided directly to the police through LOAs (Table 5). The DEP provided a long term Community Dialogue Specialist to manage the component, two Community Dialogue Analysts, one of which was assigned to Zanzibar and who worked out of the One UN Zanzibar office, and one for Dar es Salaam who was based in the project office.

The division of the original output into its two elements was logical as Output 4.1 focuses almost exclusively on assistance to the police, while Output 4.2 is broader and brings in the other

stakeholders into the dialogue forums and other efforts for peace. The commission of a conflict assessment (2014) and its updating (2016) provided information for the design of Output 4.2 as well as some performance-level information from its 2016 update.

2.4.1. Output 4.1: Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (national police) to maintain security and integrity of electoral events

The objective for Output 4.1 was to *strengthen capacities of key stakeholders to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events.* DEP intended to accomplish this through training for the police, and by expanding the Incident Reporting and Response System (IRRS) system that was started under the ESP in 2010. The objective for the TPF training was to "*increase awareness on information and skills to conduct election operations in a peaceful and respectful manner in conformity with gender and human rights principles."*[60] The original estimated budget for Output 4.1 was about USD 600,000.[61] This was increased to USD $1,486,014 during the course of the project. As of August 2016, USD 1,205,988 had been expended. All of the 4.1 intended activities were undertaken.

One of the important elements for Output 4.1 that made it a successful effort was that it took a very professional approach to supporting the TPF. DEP funded policing professionals to support the TPF for its training for Public Order Command for senior and mid-level officers. This peer-to-peer level of training and exchanges of professional experiences was an effective way to transfer knowledge and skills. It also provided national human rights and legal experts to provide the TOT on Human Rights, Gender and the Role of the Police in elections. Both of these were done in collaboration with the police and helped to improve the capacity of the TPF for electoral security; increase their understanding on the role of the police in democratic elections, and on how to handle election-related issues without escalating the problems or violating anyone's rights. Another factor was that the assistance fit the TPF's strategic plan for its development and the TPF drove the components themselves. The police were an engaged partner, took best advantage of the assistance offered by DEP, and used it to improve their electoral security engagement and reduce incidents of police violence during the 2015 elections. This type of partnership, for both the training and the upgrading of the IRRS, is a best practice.

The two trainings reached a third of the police which was more than double the target. In all 15,244 persons were trained (target was 6,244).[62] The Public Order Command course was provided for approximately 400 senior-mid level officers done by trainers from the TPF and the College of Policing in the UK, which were contracted by the TPF using LOA funds.[63] This was on managing outbreaks of civil disturbance without resorting to violence, and DFID provided additional funding that allowed for a second round of this training before the elections. The College worked with the TPF to review its public order training curriculum and found they had incorporated international policing standards for ethical human rights compliant public order for policing.[64] The College of Policing felt the application of human rights legislation under Tanzania's constitution, the appropriate use of force, and equipping officers with appropriate decision making skills were critical factors to the adoption of these standards.[65]

The cascade training on Human Rights, Gender and the Role of the Police in elections reached 15,195 police officers but started late. The LOAs were not signed until September and the training

60 DEP, *LOA with TPF* dated 9 September 2015
61 For training and IRSS systems for police. Excluding dialogue costs that were cross cutting to both outputs.
62 TPF Training report on the role of Tanzania Police Force in ensuring democratic elections, 2015, p 3
63 Another best practice as the team consisted of 10 TPF officers and one international expert from the UK College of Policing. Not only did this help to ensure it was driven by the national institution, but that the institution would use the review once it was completed.
64 College of Policing, *Tanzania Police Force Public Order Curriculum Review*, p 2
65 Ibid p 3

manuals were not reviewed in time for the start of the TOT training (although they were able to use the earlier version). This reached 15,195 police officers, 21 percent of these were women, roughly the percentage of women in the force. The biggest numbers reached were at the district and grass root levels which are the areas where the public come most into contact with the police.

The late start reduced the trainings' potential impact but observers still noted significant decrease in police incidents and increased TPF professionalism around elections security.[66] The trainings themselves lacked adequate pre- and post-tests that could capture changes in attitudes and increase in knowledge among participants. The DEP gender advisors provided through UN Women supported the revision of the training manuals to ensure gender was mainstreamed and that relevant issues were included such as violence against women in elections. UN Women felt the police had had limited exposure before the 2015 efforts on the practical and financial implications of gender mainstreaming and had gained a better understanding of this from its engagement with the project.

The TPF is still extremely interested in continuing the training engagement with DEP. They suggest that it be expanded to other security forces that help to provide security during elections, such as the prison guards and immigration officials. It also recommends training between the elections and improving the Kiswahili translations of the manuals to fix content that was distorted during translation.[67] Support for an after action review type of effort, the revision of training and operational plans, and updating of manuals to incorporate those lessons would likely be useful to improve the program for the next national event. This type of training was a first exposure for some and should be continued and expanded to reach all TPF and related security forces.

DEP also supported the upgrading of the police's IRRS that was assisted under ESP. For DEP, this included the provision of two short term IT experts and funding through an LOA. The DEP programmers worked with five police programmers to develop the system which again was a best practice. The development of the system was driven by the police. They have used the system since the elections in their work and are not only maintaining it they expanded it through the government-funded purchase of more than 4,000 radios to complement the 120 radios purchased by the project. According to the police developers, this digital system allows for digital mapping that the officers can see on their smart phones. It also allows for SMS messages to be sent to their digital radios. This GPS mapping also allows for the control centre to see the location of all police with radios on their map for dispatch and supervision purposes.

The TPF has a decentralized system of 32 regions, only some of these report through the IRRS system as the others are still using the analogue system. The software to integrate the radios into the IRRS system was developed under the project, but the repeaters outside of TPF headquarters still need configuration to complete the integration of the two systems. The TPF estimates that it needs the expertise of the same DEP expert for another three months to finish working with them on the functionality of the IRRS system. The shift to digital has also enabled the TPF to send the analogue radios that were replaced by the digital ones to areas without radios. During the elections, the TPF stated that most incidents were routed through the call centre which routed the information to the radio room which was responsible for dispatching the officers. The TPF stated that the digital IRRS system had improved their response time, but no data was available to quantify this.

[66] As an example, LHRC's *Report on the Observation of the 2015 General Elections in Tanzania*, states that despite some isolated incidences "*security forces acted more professionally in 2015 election especially during campaigns than any other years since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania*." P 316 There were issues noted by observers however in Zanzibar with the Special Forces. Expanding the training to include other forces should be included in the next trainings.

[67] According to DEP, a team from the police worked with the translator to review the translated text to ensure that there were no distortions and that the police terminology was correctly translated.

2.4.2. Output 4.2: Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections

This output intended to "*establish multi-stakeholders' dialogue forums on peaceful elections.*" DEP designed these dialogue platforms on the lesson learned from initial efforts done under the ESP and intended to build on those foundations.[68] It also used the findings from its 2014 conflict assessment to help target these activities. The original budget for this output was USD 1,630,000 of which only USD 986,910 had been expended as of August 2016. Main activities included multi-stakeholder dialogues and peace messaging. In particular, for the mainland DEP (through UN Women) supported the Tanzania Centre for Democracy to hold district-level dialogues for political parties; and, Femina Hip to organize peace festivals in six locations, including dialogues with youth. In Zanzibar it provided an LOA to the Office of the Mufti of Zanzibar (OMZ) to convene multi-stakeholder dialogues focused on preventing election-related violence and worked through UNESCO to support community radios for the peaceful resolution of conflict. The activities in Zanzibar were expanded after the election to help deter post-electoral violence.

The Community Dialogue Specialist was recruited late in the process (2015) which impacted the delivery for Component 2 and in particular for Output 4.2. One of the reasons for this late recruitment was because UNDP had difficulty in finding someone with right combination of skills, expertise and experience. The late start meant that most activities started close to the elections, limiting the number of dialogues that could be held as well as participation by some of the key stakeholders, such as political parties, which by then were already engaged in the electoral campaign.

TCD organized the party forums which was an appropriate choice. It is comprised of political parties with representatives in parliament and had worked on a similar effort in 2010 with ESP. These forums were intended to increase the ability of the party leadership to conduct their own dialogue sessions as well as providing a multi-party platform for discussions.

The original intention of the effort was to train party trainers at the national level who would then organize district level workshops. The activity started too late to undertake a cascade type of approach and the TCD held regional-level workshops instead directly with parties. The dialogue forums at the district level were also pushed back to after the elections when more senior party leaders could be available. TCD found that the parties sent different persons to the district forums than they had sent to the regional trainings requiring them to provide a recap at the start of these one-day meetings. However, they brought party representatives together with the TPF, district commissioners and CSO/Faith Based Organization (FBO) leaders that were able to identify areas of potential conflict and to look for common solutions. The 2016 review of the components in Output 4.2 found that this "*approach helped to begin building inter-party relations that had not been there previously, enabling people to contact each other again, organize further meetings where possible and reach out across party lines to resolve particular issues*."[69] In the context of a politicized and often polarized political situation, the development of networks could help to bridge divides and enable discussions on these and other critical issues. The forums also included district officials which allowed the group to discuss their issues directly with the government. The sustainability of this effort, and those of the other efforts undertaken in this output, is uncertain as many of the stakeholders do not have the funding needed to continue dialogues on their own, however some of the personal and institutional contacts made between the groups are likely to last and be of benefit in the future.

To reach youth, a consortium of NGOs (Femina Hip, Karibu Tanzania Association and the Folk Development Colleges) organized three-day peace festivals. These were intended to send a message

[68] DEP, *Project Document,* p 25

[69] Wielders, *Tanzania Conflict analysis update 2016; review of UNDP dialogue platforms for electoral violence and mitigation* , p 50

to youth, and in particular young men who are vulnerable to being used as a tool by political parties, on the importance of peaceful and appropriate participation in the elections. Most of these were organized around a sporting event to attract a larger crowd and focused primarily on sending a few critical messages on peace and the importance of voting. Timing was an issue for this component as well. In some areas the festivals coincided with political campaigns which affected the level of participation. In all, Femina Hip estimated that they reached almost 8,000 persons. Although these were organized as one-off events, the project did organize a post-electoral follow up with some of the participants, teachers, CSOs and FBOs to discuss the festival outcomes and to reinforce the messages provided during the festivals. The focus on a few key messages, and including popular youth such as sport teams, likely increased the effectiveness of the efforts in terms of reach and take-aways. In the post-election discussions, 80 percent of the participants said the festivals had increased their knowledge on these issues.

The integration of FBO, such as Inter-Religious Council for Peace in Tanzania (IRCPT) and the OMZ proved to be a critical component for providing safe spaces for difficult discussions. FBOs are also appropriate institutions for this work as they have the mission and reach to successfully deliver messages of peace and the convening power to bring different groups together in constructive dialogue. For instance, the IRCPT felt its group could reach 99 percent of the Tanzanian population. In Zanzibar, and in particular in Pemba an opposition stronghold, the dialogues organized by the OMZ reportedly helped to calm tensions in the lead up to Zanzibar's electoral re-run. Even though the OMZ was looked at suspiciously by opposition supporters in the post-election context because it is a government institution, participants came when the Mufti himself spoke.[70] As noted by the OMZ, the Mufti himself is respected and perceived as apolitical, and has the ability to gather influential persons to his meetings, each of which have their own networks. Some of these created peace committees which worked (some more than others) on the conflict issues at local levels. The OMZ tailored its meetings to the different groups it met, such as gangs, madrassa teachers, media, university youth, etc. This directly increased the relevance, and likely the effectiveness of the effort. The DEP Community Dialogue Analyst assigned to Zanzibar was an active participant in these efforts although the dialogues were owned and led by the OMZ itself which is a best practice.

The project extended the OMZ dialogues in response to the increased need for dialogue in Zanzibar after the 2015 elections. The post-electoral situation was extremely tense and the dialogue sessions provided a constructive space for participants to vent their concerns and in most cases to the government, since the OMZ included district and regional commissioners in the meetings. All of the discussions and peace messages were recorded for community radio dissemination which further expanded the reach and effectiveness of the effort.

Community radio was used in these processes as both an actor and a tool. It was used to disseminate key messages and information on efforts such as the peace festivals and dialogue forums but also developed its own programming on peace, some of which were integrated into its voter education efforts supported under other components. The 2016 review found that persons it interviewed *"credited community radios with helping to maintain peace before the elections, pointing… to how their civic education programs helped raise awareness, increased people's knowledge of electoral processes.."* and how this resulted in "*less uncertainty and less space for manipulation from politicians/candidates*"[71] The evaluation team also heard of anecdotal evidence

[70] Pemba is a CUF stronghold and the situation was extremely tense. The evaluators heard that people were told not to listen to any government agency/representative which made it difficult at the tensest times for the OMZ to organize meetings, which increased the relevance and usefulness of the interfaith approach. As noted in the IRCPT report, the *"community in Pemba perceives the office of Mufti as an agent of the government and lost respect to and compliance with of the Mufti's suggestions towards peace building"* (p 12). The IRCPT also organized a team of senior religious leaders from the Mainland of different faith umbrellas to visit the senior religious leaders in Zanzibar to show solidarity in the difficult period and to issue a collective statement to all Tanzanians to unite to maintain peace. (IRCPT *Brief Report on Peace Building Activities in Zanzibar,* p3

[71] Wielders, Op Cit, p 61

of similar results, however the actual impact from this element, and of the other activities supported in Output 4.2 are uncertain. There were other factors that affected the outcomes including other assistance efforts, and the project's M&E framework was not adequate to measure this. The public opinion surveys that were cancelled could have provided some of this information, but would have required a baseline survey at the start of the project as well as at the end to be able to detect changes of attitude, knowledge or practices.

Importantly, DEP produced a practitioner's handbook on dialogue from the best practices from partners and tools and techniques used to support dialogue. The distillation of Tanzanian experience into a handbook that is further refined over time is a potent means of increasing impact, achieving sustainability, and ensuring that earlier investments are maximized for peace dividends.

2.5. Component 5. Project Management and Advisory Services

The project management for DEP was included in the project design as Component 5. It had one output: *UNDP effectively manages DEP project operations and program delivery.* For the purposes of this terminal evaluation, project design issues are also discussed in this section of the evaluation report.

2.5.1. Project design

The project was designed as a basket fund that enabled the pooling of donor funding to support the electoral and political processes for the 2015 electoral cycle. This ensured the harmonization and coordination of funding from nine donors and UNDP, which substantially reduced the management and reporting burden for participating organizations. This also enabled unused funding from the previous ESP project to be transferred to directly to the DEP basket fund after approval from the donor.

The DEP project design was based largely on activities undertaken by UNDP's previous electoral support project and the lessons learned from that experience. Areas of need were also identified from the 2010 election observer reports. These are best practices as it helps to avoid making the same mistakes and allows for the project to move ahead in a more efficient and effective manner. The design was also well grounded in the electoral cycle approach which takes a longer term developmental view of electoral assistance as strengthening the processes and institutions engaged in those processes, rather than seeing it as short-term support to hold an electoral event (such as an election). This electoral cycle approach has been found to be more effective and provide more sustainable results than event-focused support. The DEP design also broadened the programme concept to include other stakeholders around the concept of "democratic empowerment" which was, and still is, extremely relevant and needed in the context.

The project included the main actors in the electoral process: the EMBs, political parties, the judiciary, ORPP, media and civil society. Missing in this equation were the policy makers, perhaps because the project assumption was that the policy elements would be addressed in the constitutional reform process. The four outcome areas identified for support: legal and institutional reforms, electoral administration, participation and peaceful elections were appropriate for the context and needs. The electoral justice elements were mentioned in the design, but barely. However, the inclusion of the judiciary for a training in Component 1 allowed this element to be developed considerably during implementation, which addressed a demonstrated need and provided effective assistance. The inclusion of peace building and the use of the media as a tool were especially important given the context and the way the 2015 electoral process developed, and in particular with the nullification of the 2015 election results in Zanzibar. Having this component in place, along with a project focus on youth, allowed for a rapid response and engaged a critical population group (youth) to play a constructive rather than a destructive role in the process. This was also the case for the media elements, which allowed for the community radios to adjust their programming to cover these issues and provide relevant information. However, there was no criteria

for the selection of the community radio stations for the project other than being part of the network of stations already assisted by UNESCO. The project did not have an electoral early warning system incorporated into the design or targeting based on that system which is something to include in the next project.[72]

The One UN approach within the design followed the institutional comparative advantages of the three engaged UN agencies: UNDP, UN Women and UNESCO. However, only the UNDP and UN Women recruited project staff were listed together as the project team in the design while the UNESCO hired project staff was not. The organizational structure and the degree of integration of project staff are elements that need to be better addressed and worked out in the design phase.

The design focused primarily on strengthening the supply side of the electoral process.[73] More attention to the demand side could have strengthened the project-- either through a synergistic arrangement with other projects, or by including advocacy in the legal and institutional reforms elements. Issues of political and institutional culture also needed to have been better factored into the design and assistance strategy. Particularly in regards to the nature of the long-term project staff and the need and receptivity for long term CTA-type of technical assistance. There also seemed to be an implicit assumption that assistance to electoral and political processes could remain at technical levels, separate from the "political" aspects of the processes which was not realistic. Beyond the need to uphold international norms and standards for free, fair and credible electoral processes, electoral assistance is provided within a highly politicized context where all technical decisions have political consequences. In the bigger picture, this is one of the reasons why it is so important to get persons with the right experience and temperament for these types of assistance projects, and why in some cases (such as Component 4) it took multiple recruitment efforts to find someone with the right combination of skills.

These assumptions were also reflected in the risk analysis where some of the risk management measures identified were insufficient for the size of the potential risk. For example, for the risk that *the country's political leadership may not be ready to introduce necessary reforms to the NEC structure including those relating to its independence and funding,"* the mitigation measure is that the "*NEC must engage closely with the constitutional reform process …"* If an institution is not independent, and there is a lack of will at the policy levels for it to be independent, then it is unlikely that this is something that this institution could push for on its own and be successful. This example also illustrates the need for the advocacy elements and support for the agents of change within the policy arena that could help to actively promote EMB independence and the other norms for free and fair elections.

The results framework for the project was changed during implementation. According to the PMT and UN Women, this was done because the original framework was not specific enough for implementation. UNDP hired an expert in the first year to work on the framework and develop performance indicators, and work continued on this by the PMT until it was eventually finalized in 2015. At this point in time, the benefits of reworking the framework were not clear. The revised framework reorganized the activities, some in not a very logical manner as noted in particular for Component 2. The rewording for some of the results also seemed to weaken the integrity focus of the original framework. The indicators finally adopted were also mainly outputs (such as number of staff trained) which were not sufficient for the project to adequately capture some of its higher level results. However, it is also the amount of time and effort that was spent massaging the framework which could have been spent instead on implementing the framework. Indicators and targets also need to be set at the start of a project as otherwise they can move the goal posts and provide a

[72] If this system is being developed by another project, then synergistic programming is recommended.

[73] There were many reasons cited in interviews for why the project design ended up as it did. However, for the purposes of the final evaluation, the design as approved in the Project Document is the basis for the evaluation of the project and its performance as this is what everyone agreed to when signing the document and funding the project.

distorted view of overall project performance. This was what was intended by the project design which stated "*an M&E framework will be developed within the first six months of project implementation*."[74] However, as noted by the DEP Midterm Evaluation in August 2015, two and a half years into the project, the project was "*still busy in establishing baselines and data collection mechanisms.*"[75]

2.5.2 Project management and implementation

The project had a very slow start up. Recruitment of some staff took six or more months. UNDP compensated for this by hiring a project management consultant to develop a budgeted work plan, staffing requirements and results matrix. It also hired a BVR expert to help the EMBs with the registration planning efforts. The Project Manager, CTA and Operations Manager were not on board until fall 2013 and the project office was not set up and occupied until January 2014. The final staff list provided to the evaluators by the project listed 32 persons including three UN Volunteers, four persons recruited by UN Women and the remainder hired by UNDP. No one from UNESCO was listed.

The organization and operations of the PMT were problematic and contentious for the first part of the project. There were conflicting opinions on the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines of the CTA, Operations Manager, Project Manager and some experts which created tensions and affected their work and relations. One of the main factors was the lack of NEC acceptance for embedded TA which changed the nature of the team's roles and responsibilities. In the original project structure (Box 3), the CTA was to provide leadership for all technical assistance to the NEC and ZEC and lead high level consultations, while the Project Manager was to provide the overall organizational, coordination and managerial support for the project and act as day-to-day officer-in charge.[76] This became problematic with limited demand from the NEC for CTA type of services.

Box 4: Final DEP Project Organogram



The project structure went through several reiterations and a final version was not adopted until the end of October 2014, almost two years into the project (Box 4). It was still an issue during the mid-term evaluation done in August 2015 which found that the: "*project organizational structure is … complex and the divergent understanding of roles, mandates and hierarchies has considerably hampered the coordination among the project team and as well with the UNDP CO.*"[77]

[74] DEP, *Project Document*, p 37
[75] DEP, *Midterm Evaluation*, p 5
[76] DEP, *Project Document* pps 40 - 45
[77] DEP, *Midterm Evaluation*, p 4

The design for the TA as well as for the project structure is one often used in a UN mission context. Resident Coordinators are active participants in any electoral support project because of the political nature of the sector and the policy-level issues that are raised during the course of assistance. However, day-to-day supervision and management of a development project normally remains with the UNDP Country Office.[78] It is also notable that the project advisors hired by UNESCO for the media components were not even figured into the project's organizational structure.

Procurements were slow and directly affected the implementation of the project. For instance, the purchase for the TPF's digital VHF radio equipment for the IRRS took almost a year (purchase order done on 18 December 2014, equipment received 11 October 2015). It took almost five months for the AV equipment (such as LCD projectors) for the media and observer centres to be delivered (purchase order 27 May 2015, received 7 October 2015). Among other impacts, the late delivery of the IRSS and media/observer centres' equipment affected the timing for the medium-term experts working on these processes, requiring several amendments to their contracts.[79]

Another issue that directly affected project management and efficiency as well as relations with development partners was the level of control exercised by the Country Office over the project for its first years. Although the design foresees the hiring of experienced project professionals, and indeed the project manager recruited had also been the manger of the ESP project, the Country Office controlled almost every aspect of the project including its communications with development partners, activities and requisitions. The project design intended to improve project management for DEP since the implementation of the ESP had been slow. Mechanisms included obtaining fast-track procurement authority from UNDP NY (which is the norm for elections-related projects), and for the project manager to have delegated authority to approve payments of up to USD 30,000.[80] This was not requested until 2015 after a change of UNDP management. Rules about informal communications between the project and development partners were also then eased. This improved relations and increased the efficiency of the project. However, the project's delegated authority throughout its life stayed at USD 100 cash.[81]

The DEP situation demonstrates how different perceptions of roles and responsibilities can affect the implementation of an electoral assistance project (or any project), and the need to ensure these issues are clarified before a project starts. It also points to the need for UNDP headquarters to ensure its country offices and staff have the latest UNDP guidelines and standard procedures for electoral assistance projects which it has documented in various UNDP handbooks and reference materials.

At the same time, it needs to be noted that the project delivered most of its outputs and the Department for International Development (DFID) annual review of its assistance which included DEP gave it an "A" rating overall for 2016. Their report stated that at that point (which looked at the assistance from August 2015 on) the project was fully staffed, delivering most of the project outputs, and that many of the earlier issues had been addressed. UNDP also used its own Country Office resources to help implement the project. For example, to increase the speed of procurement towards the elections it brought in three additional UNDP procurement officers to work on DEP.

UN Women and UNESCO elements are having their own final evaluations. Unfortunately those were not done in time to inform this higher level project evaluation. However, a few points were evident during the interviews for this evaluation. The UNESCO component was considered as outsourced, so there were fewer management issues noticeable with the CTA and project team. UNESCO also had parallel Swiss funding for community radio activities that it used to complement the DEP project activities to strengthen the non-DEP elements of their assistance to community radios. It attended

[78] Per the project document (p 40) the CTA reports to the Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative.
[79] Information from interviews of DEP staff
[80] DEP *Project Document*, p 45
[81] Information from interviews.

the once a week DEP project meeting for coordination purpose. Very little information was available to the evaluators on the UNESCO internal management of its component but this information should be available through the UNESCO component evaluation which is expected to be completed in December 2016. One of its initial findings though was that its M&E elements were insufficient.

UN Women had a hybrid relationship. It was responsible for Component 3, which could have been treated like UNESCO's component (outsourced), but at the same time UN Women was responsible for providing the gender expertise and gender mainstreaming elements for the entire project. This dichotomy created issues during implementation and required considerable negotiation between UNDP and UN Women to clarify roles, responsibilities and operating modalities. It is not clear why these issues were not worked out during the project design phase, but is a lesson for the next project as this took considerable time that should have been devoted to project implementation. As it was, the gender experts often had to move between the UN Women and project office, spending unnecessary time and on occasions having to catch up on missed opportunities.

Another issue for Component 3 was that their experts had to use the UN Women's operations/ finance systems for their work, which are not specifically fast tracked for the elections. As such, for easier access, exchange of information, planning and implementation, it would be more effective to have the UN Women team in the same office as the main project team. Operations and finance support specifically devoted to the UN Women team should have also been considered in the design of the project, in order to support the programme staff. At the same time, UN Women was extremely focused on its part of the project. It ensured CSOs worked together on their efforts, produced numerous reports and incorporated M&E elements into all of their contracts.

Programmatically, the UN Women and the UNESCO components were synergized with their own institutional programs and focus which added value to the broader efforts for democratic empowerment. In particular, the UN Women was able to leverage the DEP funding to expand its activities related to women's empowerment and provide a more comprehensive effort than would have been the case without the additional funding. UNESCO also found additional funding to complement the DEP-funded community radio programs and support its community radio network.

Project Reporting. The project kept all of the basic records needed for project management. It ensured activity reports were done for the different activities and collected data for each of them. It also ensured that the main components undertook lessons learned and/or mini-evaluations of their work. It issued project reports as required by the project document although some were late. It started the monthly/weekly project newsletters which provided some useful information and overviews of particular electoral activities. However, donors felt the project withheld timely information on some critical issues and that project reporting was insufficient for their own reporting needs.[82] The evaluators found that the reports contained a lot of information and were generally open about problems encountered and lessons learned. However, a key issue for this terminal evaluation was that it was difficult to separate out what the project had accomplished from what the partner institutions had accomplished, and to understand from the reports exactly what type of assistance was provided in some cases. Although it was a partnership effort that supported national institutions and processes and it is important to highlight the work of the national partner, the specific information on what the project did (or did not do) is important to document as that is the only way to know if the assistance provided was useful and made a difference.

Project Committees. The project set up the steering and technical committees that made the decisions for the project and shared information. There was also a technical committee set up in Zanzibar to coordinate efforts there. These met during the process, although development partners felt some were not held often enough, especially during the last phase of the project, and/or provided documents for the meetings at the last minute which did not provide them with the time

[82] As an example, development partners said they were not adequately informed of staff movement out of Zanzibar, illustrating the importance for timely information sharing at the technical levels.

to review and assess the information. From interviews, the mechanisms seemed too cumbersome to provide effective, timely project oversight and information sharing. The Steering Committee also seemed to be used as an opportunity for participants to question the EMBs on the status of electoral process and preparations. Some of the participants said this was their only access to the NEC and appreciated the meetings as they were eager to get answers from them on the process. However, at the same time, the focus on electoral preparations diverted attention away from project management and implementation issues.

There did not appear to be another mechanism that regularly provided a forum for the international community to meet with the EMBs to share information and get updates on the status of the process other than some high level policy and inter-donor meetings. In other countries, these types of meetings are held regularly, usually hosted by the UNDP Country Director or UN Resident Coordinator and the EMBs, and are completely separate from project steering committees. They include all of the donors to an electoral process, including those who contribute bilaterally or through other mechanisms than the UNDP-managed basket fund. Starting this type of meeting for the next electoral cycle could help to depoliticize the project steering and technical committees meetings and increase their effectiveness as project management tools.

The project used a DIM mechanism whereby UNDP is the implementing agency. The evaluation found this as the most appropriate mechanism for the nature of the project and context within Tanzania. The DIM is the default mechanism for UNDP electoral support projects worldwide because of the potential for partisan bias in national implementation. UNDP, as a part of the United Nations, is considered as an impartial implementer. The DEP project also assisted several government agencies in addition to the EMBs as well as nongovernmental stakeholders. The DIM mechanism allowed all of these stakeholders to be assisted with minimum administrative and management burden placed on any of the participating organizations. In addition, the use of LOAs to channel some of the DEP funding directly to these agencies allowed for these organizations to implement a good part of the project directly in accordance with the LOA program descriptions.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1. Conclusions

1. *Democratic empowerment assistance was needed and relevant for the 2015 electoral cycle.* The range of stakeholders and project partners selected were highly relevant and critical to strengthening Tanzania's electoral and political processes. The areas supported by DEP were also extremely relevant-- electoral reform, institutional capacity of key electoral and political process actors, more inclusive participation and reducing elections-related conflict. The inclusion of political processes and actors into the project, such as political parties and the ORPP, even though not fully developed programmatically, opened space for more attention to these critical areas for the next phase of EPP assistance.

2. *The electoral cycle approach of the DEP project was a best practice and was appropriate for the Tanzanian context and needs.* This allowed for support to be provided early on to the EMBs for the voter registration process which was an essential precondition for the expected constitutional referendum. However, the delays and management issues noted along with late inputs and continuing tinkering with the project framework undermined the cycle approach, affecting its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, potential impact and the sustainability of its results. It also requires the commitment from the EMBs to effectively use the assistance offered, without which the project's prospective impact is limited.

3. *The One UN approach added value to the project*. The DEP design followed the comparative advantage of the three UN agencies and their participation added depth and dimension to most components. Their areas of expertise complemented each other and provided for a

more systematic approach to issues of equal participation as well as expanded the informational reach of the project through the community radios. However, these efforts needed more programmatic integration during implementation.

4. DEP *results were more substantial when conceived and implemented as a more cohesive programme targeting higher level outcomes*, such as by the efforts of UN Women which integrated the DEP activities into their larger women's empowerment effort. Results were also more substantial where DEP worked in partnership with a national institution or partner that was committed and drove that effort, such as with the judiciary and TPF. This was also evident for some of the conflict prevention elements undertaken in Component 4. For other elements, their parcelled up nature, indifference of some of the partners for the type of assistance offered, implementation issues and/or other factors reduced their results to the activity-levels.

5. *Outcome level results n*oted in the 2015 electoral and political processes *are likely the cumulative effect of previous UNDP-managed electoral assistance projects* and other development efforts undertaken in the sector. Attribution for results specifically to DEP is difficult in most cases without better indicators and the level of other assistance to the sector (Attachment 1). The outcomes for other activities, such as those with women aspirants for political office, will likely only be visible in the next electoral cycle. However, from the available data and interviews, it appears likely that DEP did strengthen the key institutions to more effectively implement their election and political function in that it:

    a) *strengthened the institutional policies and systems, as well as increased professionalism in electoral administration* that contributed to holding more inclusive[83] and better organized elections. The events in Zanzibar were political and beyond the control of a technical project or technical electoral administrators and highlight the need to increase focus and advocacy[84] on the normative aspects of the electoral and political processes and the independence of the EMBs.

    b) *opened space for more inclusive dialogue and CSO participation* with the EMBs and other institutions involved in EPP that enabled them to advocate for the rights of women and to a lesser degree youth and PWD, and to support the strengthening of the processes by providing feedback and recommendations to the institutions.

    c) *improved draft legislation* for the elections, political parties and political party financing as it enabled the input of a wider range of stakeholder on non-discrimination against women, youth and PWD and strengthening of the accountability and credibility aspects of the process. Although not adopted, the consultative processes were useful and resulted in drafts which can be introduced in the next parliament.

    d) *contributed to a more peaceful electoral climate and process* than would have been likely without the assistance. DEP also strengthened the networks of institutions working for peace and conciliation and started an ongoing dialogue process that is expected to be picked up by UNDP's pending project on citizens' voice and participation, which focuses on strengthening partnerships and dialogue for development.

    e) *increased awareness of stakeholders and institutions* on concepts of inclusive participation and gender mainstreaming. These concepts were institutionalized within the EMBs, and in particular with the ZEC, and the replication of the Social Inclusion Policy by other Zanzibar government agencies could expand this gain further in the future. The ORPP also adopted a Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policy, which is a first step towards increasing gender equity and inclusion in political parties.

[83] Inclusive in terms of participation of women, youth and PWD.
[84] By CSOs, political parties, international community and others.

f) *strengthened the role of the ORPP* in resolving inter/intra party disputes with political parties through the development of a dispute resolution mechanism, and increased the space for party discussions and negotiations. The impact of this assistance is likely to be seen in the 2020 electoral cycle if assistance is continued. Resolving political events on the scale of the Zanzibar events is likely to surpass the current role of the ORPP, and highlights the need to strengthen electoral justice and redress mechanisms.

g) *increased elements of electoral justice* by increasing the knowledge of judges on electoral laws, and reducing the processing time to resolve electoral disputes. The nature of the training and the networks developed likely also strengthened judicial handling of other matters. The legal framework for electoral justice though, still needs strengthening.

h) *strengthened the capacity of the TPF* to respond more appropriately for electoral security, and strengthened its overall ability to respond to citizens' needs in a more timely and appropriate manner, especially with respect to human rights and gender responsiveness. This is being institutionalized through changes in the curriculum and with its adoption of digital technologies.

i) *strengthened the role of community radio in inclusive dialogue and* peace building and started their integration into the networks for peace.

6. The EMBs demonstrated their ability to deliver elections in 2015, decreasing the relevance and need for long term TA for the future. Improving the enabling environment for elections and the independence of key institutions remain key challenges. Tanzania is still in transition towards more inclusive, democratic governance and still needs support to strengthen its democratic development and key institutions within the country.

3.1.Challenges for future

The 2020 electoral cycle is beginning now. Looking forward, there are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in any future support provided for the electoral and political processes. These would include:

- ensuring the sustainability of results and improvements gained from the ESP and DEP projects, most notably in terms of professional development, investment in ICT and large equipment system such as the IRRS and institutionalization of improved procedures and policies, adoption of the legal and institutional reforms supported, and inclusive participation of marginalized groups.
- strengthening the normative aspects of electoral and political processes raised in the election observer reports, including:
    - Credibility, integrity and transparency of EPP processes and institutions;
    - Electoral justice and resolving the electoral issues in Zanzibar that led to an opposition boycott;
    - Increased independence of EMBs;
    - More democratic and inclusive political parties;
    - More inclusive and knowledgeable participation by citizens,
    - Adoption of needed EPP reforms;
    - Strengthening women's and youth leadership in EPP; and,
    - Ensuring political commitment for free, fair and transparent EPP processes.
- maintaining development partner and NEC interest in consolidating DEP-assisted gains and in the importance of early programmatic support and assistance for 2020 cycle.

- finding appropriate roles for technical assistance with the EMBs and others and ensuring timely support for next EPP cycle.
- ensuring synergies between the next electoral cycle project and other UNDP/UN/development partner programmes (such as parliament, peace building, civic participation, women's empowerment, education, advocacy, etc.).

3.2.Recommendations

Looking forward, the evaluation team recommends:

1. *Continued electoral cycle support* to strengthen the electoral and political processes and key actors and institutions engaged in those processes. This effort needs to start with a frank discussion on the events in Zanzibar and on the commitment and steps needed to resolve the current political situation and to avoid its repetition in the future. Assuming this issue is addressed, the next project should start early enough in the process so that it can support needed reforms and a resolution for Zanzibar, and help to strengthen EMB capacity and integrity before the next election. It should then also stay long enough after the event so that it can support lessons learned and planning for the next cycle. The project should adopt a programmatic and developmental approach and ensure all project activities and components are synergized and mutually supportive regardless of the nature of implementation. Funding should be used carefully, targeting areas where it can make the most difference. This should be based on needs assessments, analysis of the 2015 experience and post-DEP political situation. Areas of focus should include:

    a) *improving the enabling environment* for free and fair elections through support for legal and institutional reforms, institution and citizen advocacy, and dissemination of information;

    b) *continued strengthening of the electoral, political and judicial institutions* to more effectively fill their EPP role and better understand their responsibilities within the EPP system. Expand the assistance where there are engaged and committed partners. Rethink the type of assistance where there are not. Finish the accreditation process for the EMB BRIDGE facilitators and then support the EMBs to provide their own in-service trainings;

    c) *increasing the knowledgeable participation of both parties and voters.* Civic education is a demonstrated need and links could be made between the educational sector and EPP institutions. As an example, EMBs could engage CSOs and/or higher learning institutions in the provision of more broad-based civic awareness that can complement the punctual voter education efforts made during the electoral periods;

    d) *strengthening the political leadership of women, youth and PWD* and ensure the inclusion of marginalized groups. This should be expanded beyond the current target groups and be determined through mapping of geographic and demographic factors such as turnout and areas of elections-related conflict and violence against women in past elections to improve targeting;

    e) *strengthening the capacity of EMBs and the ORPP in taking up a gender equality and social inclusion agenda* or implementing the policies and strategies already adopted to ensure greater effectiveness in the implementation of these components within future electoral administration;

    f) *enhancing electoral security, integrity and justice* measures among key stakeholders and actors by continuing Component 4 type of activities and targeting interventions at areas that are prone to conflict and/or had other electoral issues, and enhancing the institutional accountability aspects of the processes and institutions;

g) *strengthening the political analysis*, situational mapping, scenario development and contingency planning for the project. Identify potential triggers for problems and benchmarks that would generate an immediate review of the situation and project and initiate deterrence and/or mitigation measures; and,

h) *developing an early warning system* for electoral integrity issues and conflict that would feed into the situational mapping and analysis and link directly to the programmatic content and location for EPP-related programming.

2. *Resolve issues at the design stage* including: agreement between UN agencies and any other implementers on the scope of their activities and level of integration into the project; and type and conditions for assistance for the different institutions. Adopt a flexible results framework that will provide direction but still allows for the project to adapt to a changing context or take advantage of window of opportunities. Make refinements to the work plans rather than the framework. Establish the M&E indicators and targets at the start of the project, and use indicators that can measure performance as well as outputs.

3. *Ensure synergistic programming with other UNDP-supported or other development partner projects,* especially those working on good governance, with political parties, in parliament, on education, and others to ensure mutually supportive and coordinated programming. A future electoral cycle project should especially be designed to complement UNDP's anticipated citizen voice and participation project.

4. *Ensure quicker start up* so that activities can start well before the electoral period and can address key issues in the less politicized atmosphere between elections and before they become campaign issues. Continue programmatic assistance well after the event to consolidate gains and help ensure their sustainability, and assist the planning processes for 2025.

5. *Streamline project management and reporting structures* with an emphasis on programmatic assistance with technical assistance provided on an as needed basis. Ensure the PMT is provided with an adequate delegation of authority from the start of project so that it can effectively manage the project. Ask for fast track procurement authorization at project signing. Provide the relevant UNDP Country Office and project staff with copies of UNDP's implementation guide for electoral assistance.[85]

6. *Develop routine channels for project consultations* with stakeholders and development partners and vice-versa apart from the formal steering and technical committee mechanisms to foster a greater sense of participation and partnership in the implementation of the programme and to help exchange information, and address and resolve issues quickly. These channels are essential for an electoral cycle project to remain relevant and effective as the electoral calendar is dynamic and will not wait for a quarterly or bi-annual meeting.

7. *Continued use of DIM implementation* mechanism in the Tanzanian context. Consideration should be given to which government agencies should be the counterpart for the next project since the assistance is provided to a broad group of stakeholders, all of which have differing levels of interest in the project. Continued use of LOAs to transfer funds to other partners to help implement different elements of the project.

[85] UNDP has an Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide that it published in 2009 (http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systemsandprocesses/undp-electoral-assistance-implementation-guide/) and an online version (Online Toolkit on Electoral Assistance). It also has policies on processes with DPA/EAD, Electoral Needs Assessment Guidelines, the Note of Guidance on electoral assistance, and the Policy on the Use of the Electoral Roster which can help to expedite electoral recruitment (which was developed after DEP started). It also has Guidelines for working with the European Commission on electoral assistance and training (http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/).

Attachment 1: Donor Assistance to the 2015 Electoral Processes

Support to DEP and others in USD per funding agency: [86]



Total support: USD 59, 327,658
Other support: USD 35,334,036

Allocation of funding through mechanisms other than DEP:



[86] Chart from Development Partners Group Tanzania, *Analysis of DP's support for Elections in Tanzania,* pps 3 and 5

Attachment 2: Results Framework



Attachment 3: Revised Framework



Attachment 4: Results and Indicator Framework (Final)

2013-16 Democratic Empowerment Project (DEP) – Results and Indicator Framework

Component #1: Legal and Institutional Reforms for Credible Elections

Two key medium-term results anticipated in this Component:

Output 1.1: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections.

Output 1.2: Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes.

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Methods for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
Output 1.1 Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections.	a) Number (#) of the targeted laws reformed and their adherence to international standards b)evidence of the *enactment* of the reforms into law and their *implementation* by the key institutions (EMBs, ORP))	2010: i) Election observer reports reiterated the need for a review of the electoral legal and institutional framework. ii) gaps exist in the current electoral laws and 4 have been identified for review: - National Elections Act, 2010; - Political Parties Act, 1992; - Election Expenses Act, 2010; - The Constitutional Review Act, 2012.	At least 2 of the targeted laws reformed and adhere to international standards Reforms enacted into law and implemented in the 2015 general elections	***Sources***: ORPP reports, EMBs' reports, Hansard report, Gazette Notice, media reports ***Methods***: Document review, Expert assessment of revised laws	Annually Component 1 leader

Output 1.2 Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes.	**Judiciary** # of electoral related disputes lodged with the Judiciary and # of the disputes resolved in timely[1] manner.	2010: 40 petitions[2] lodged with the Judiciary	At least 80% of the disputes lodged with Judiciary resolved within the stipulated timeframe	**Sources**: Judiciary reports, revised guidelines, observer reports, media reports **Methods**: documents review, observation/review of revised guidelines	Annually Component 1 Leader
	Political Parties a)Evidence of the dispute resolution mechanisms to address inter and intra party disputes b)Evidence of use of these mechanisms by political parties to resolve inter/intra party disputes e.g. - # of political-party disputes lodged and resolved peacefully - Reduction in number of party disputes ending up in court	There were no formal dispute resolution mechanisms in place in 2010 besides the court to address inter and intra party disputes. Petitions were received by the Judiciary, registered and heard as a civil suit. Some political parties in 2010 attempted to silence or remove prominent dissenters as a way of resolving disputes.	Dispute resolution mechanisms established for the ORPP and used by political parties to address inter & intra-party disputes in 2015 general elections	**Source**: ORPP reports, EMB reports, media reports **Methods**: Documents review	Annually Component 1 Leader
Output 1.1 Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections (aggregate outcome of sub outputs- 1.1.1 – 1.1.6)					
Sub-output 1.1.1 **Election guidelines and regulations revised to support inclusive and credible elections**	Evidence of revision of election guidelines and regulations (E.g. party nomination procedures by political parties, codes of conduct…)		Gender and social inclusion principles mainstreamed in the revised guidelines and regulations Revisions undertaken in	**Sources**: EMB reports, ORPP reports, revised guidelines and regulations **Methods**: Document review, observation	Quarterly Election Management Specialist (Dar es Salaam)

[1] Timeliness as within the legally stipulated timelines

[2] In relation to: destruction of campaign materials; disruption of political party election activities; underage registration; double registration; use of offensive language; insufficient time being allocated for the registration process; campaigns advanced beyond the stipulated timeframes; political parties unsatisfied with how their complaints were handled; misuse of state resources including government vehicles; students not being able to vote.

			timely manner in readiness for the 2015 general elections		
Sub-output 1.1.2 **Zanzibar Referendum law Reviewed**	Evidence of review of the Zanzibar referendum law Gazettement of the revised law	Referendum law exists but requires review to address existing gaps	Referendum law revised Revised law enacted into law (by end of project?)	**Sources**: ZEC reports, Gazette notice, media reports **Methods**: Observation, document review	Quarterly Election Management Specialist (Zanzibar)
Sub Output 1.1.3 **Office of the Registrar of Political Parties strengthened to support the constitutional review process in an inclusive manner**	Evidence of discussion forums # of forums held & # of participants in attendance (disaggregated by sex, age, political party, geographical location).		Regular dialogue forums held on constitutional review	**Sources**: ORPP reports, pictures from the discussion forum **Methods**: Document review, observation	Quarterly
(CANCELLED)	% of stakeholders expressing satisfaction in their participation in the constitutional review process(disaggregated by age, sex, political party, geographical location)	N/A	Target: 70-80% satisfied	**Sources**: survey/evaluation report **Methods**: part of the evaluation questions in mid-term/final project evaluation	Mid-term/end of project
Sub Output 1.1.4 **Key electoral laws reformed to facilitate active engagement of women, youth and PWDs in electoral processes**	Evidence of revision of the laws Evidence of integration of gender and social inclusion principles in the revised laws	Gaps exist in current laws. Need for reform to facilitate participation of women, youth & PWDs in electoral processes. **4 laws targeted for review**: *National Elections Act, 2010; Political Parties Act, 1992; Election Expenses Act, 2010; Constitutional Review Act, 2012*.	Targeted laws revised by 2015 elections Gender and Social inclusion principles mainstreamed in the revised frameworks	***Sources***: ORPP reports, EMBs reports, UN Women reports, media reports ***Methods***: Documents Review	Quarterly

Sub Output 1.1.5 **Enhanced EMBs-Political Parties engagement in electoral processes**	Evidence of conduct of EMB-political parties dialogue forums - # of dialogue forums held & # of participants per forum (disaggregated by sex, political parties)	2010: Minimal EMBs-political parties engagement In 2010, political parties' level of satisfaction in their engagement with	EMB-political party dialogue forums held on regular basis	**Sources**: EMB reports, ORPP reports, media reports **Methods**: Document review, observation (disability)	Quarterly
	- continued engagement political parties & EMBs in the dialogue forums	EMBs was low due to poor sharing of information by EMBs.	EMBs and Political parties actively engage in the dialogue forums.		Community Dialogue Specialist/Election Management Specialists
Sub output 1.1.6 **Enhanced capacity of Political Parties to engage in electoral processes**	# of training sessions delivered # of party officials and party agents trained (disaggregated by sex, political party, geographical location - national/regional/district levels)	Political parties in Tanzania lacked adequate capacity to effectively engage in electoral process. In 2010 Political Parties expressed concern over election processes and experienced difficulties in the quality and quantity of information from NEC	At least 1 regional workshop held per region party agents from all registered political parties trained	**Sources:** Training reports, ORPP reports, **Methods**: Documents review	
	increase in awareness of political parties on the electoral laws and electoral processes		80% of political parties members trained express increased awareness	**Method**: Pre & post training surveys	
<u>Output 1.2</u> Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes *(aggregate outcome of sub outputs- 1.2.1 – 1.2.2)*					

Sub Output 1.2.1 **Strengthened capacity of the Judiciary in handling electoral related disputes**	# of judicial staff (judges, magistrates, state attorneys and registrar) trained - disaggregated by sex & geographical location (Mainland/Zanzibar)	2010: 21 judges and 60 magistrates trained in electoral complaints and appeals process(ESP 2010 Annual Report) 2015 elections: Reforms in electoral dispute resolution anticipated through introduction of minimal reforms or through the referendum on the draft constitution. Anticipated reforms include the petitioning of presidential results	At least 90 Judiciary staff from Mainland and Zanzibar trained on electoral dispute resolution	**Sources**: Training reports **Methods**: Document review	Quarterly
	Proportion of judiciary staff trained highlighting increased skills and knowledge in presiding over election related disputes	N/A	80% and above highlight increased knowledge and skills.	**Sources**: DEP reports, workshop reports **Methods**: pre& post training survey	Quarterly
Sub Output 1.2.2 **Strengthened capacity of political parties to resolve inter & intra-party disputes**	Establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms to address inter & intra-party disputes	There were no formal dispute resolution mechanisms applied by political parties in 2010 but in some cases, political parties attempted to silence or remove prominent dissenters as a way of resolving disputes.	Dispute resolution mechanisms established for the ORPP and staff trained on their application	**Source**: ORPP reports, training reports, DEP reports **Methods**: documents review	Quarterly

Component 2: Electoral Management Bodies supported to improve the integrity of their planning and operations and their overall management capacity

Two key medium-term results anticipated in this Component:

Output 2.1: EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks enhanced to support the holding of credible elections.

Output 2.2: EMBs systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections.

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Method for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
<u>Output 2.1:</u> EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks enhanced to support the holding of credible elections.	Performance of EMBs in planning, management and execution of key tasks - key plans[1] developed on time and are well detailed - timeliness in implementation of plans - percentage (%) of the plans implemented	2010: EMBs had limited capacity to develop an integrated Electoral Management Plan. EU Report: there is need for the EMBs to have detailed election calendars and for transparency in results management to build public confidence in the electoral process TACCEO: Improved training of election officials is needed.	EMBs plan, manage and execute key tasks in a transparent and effective manner 80% implementation rate	***Source:*** Media reports, Election observers reports ***Method***: Documents review, Observation, DEP assessment of completion rate.	Annually Elections Management Specialists (EMS)

[1] For example: Elections calendar and logistics plan; gender and social inclusion policy; stakeholders engagement strategy; voter education strategy; communication strategy; BVR reception and logistics plan for BVR roll out; Codes of Conduct (for EMB officials, observers, political parties); strategic plan

	# of eligible voters **registered** to vote disaggregated by sex & geographical location – Mainland/Zanzibar)	2010: Voting age population = 21,189,992 (i.e. 95%) Total # of eligible voters registered: **20, 137, 303** **Mainland**: 19,729,648 registered **Zanzibar**: 407, 655 (male 185,739, female 221,916) registered	Voting age population in 2015: 24,252,927 (National Bureau of Statistics) **NEC:** All eligible voters registered factoring in 10% voter apathy **ZEC:** All eligible voters registered i.e. 503,860	**Source**: EMB reports **Methods**: document review	Annually
	Level of confidence of key stakeholders in the integrity of the voter register	2010: Stakeholders expressed low confidence in the integrity of the voter register stating double registration, missing names, incorrect polling stations as the most prominent causes for inaccuracy	At least 80% of key stakeholders express confidence in the credibility of the voter register	***Source***: Survey reports, election observer reports/audit report ***Method***: public perception surveys, independent audit of the voter register	Quarter following completion of voter registration exercise
Output 2.2: **EMBs systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections**	Evidence of dialogue forums between EMBs and key stakeholders (political parties, media, election observers, organisations working with youth, women & PWDs	2010: EMBs perceived as lacking transparency and not engaging with stakeholders - EMBs operated on a policy of only availing information on demand thereby dramatically reducing their level of transparency and increasing mistrust with stakeholders. European Union (EU) report: EMBs should be more transparent when dealing with domestic and international observers.	Enhanced EMBs engagement with electoral stakeholders	***Source***: EMBs reports, ORPP reports, observer reports, media reports ***Method***: Documents review	Annually Elections Management Specialists (EMS)

	Evidence of mechanisms implemented by EMBs to enhance inclusivity and transparency in elections	2010: use of sign language interpreters for deaf people on NEC's TV announcements, introduction of VE material using Braille, visually-impaired could be accompanied by someone to polling booth; voter education	EMBs implement mechanisms promoting the participation of women, youth and PWDs in 2015 general elections	***Source***: EMB reports, UN Women reports, media reports, observer reports	Annually
		material prepared as comic books aimed at basic or low literacy population; sms for voters to verify their data and polling stations (ESP 2010 Annual Report)		***Method***: Document review, content analysis, observation	
	Stakeholders' level of satisfaction with enhancements undertaken by EMBs to enhance inclusivity and transparency in elections		At least 70% of the stakeholders satisfied	***Source:*** Evaluation reports/Survey report **Method**: perception survey/project evaluation/score cards	Annually
	Reduction in time taken to declare election results	2010: Results declared in 72 hours.	From 72 to 48 hours	**Source**: EMB official announcement of results **Method**: Documents review, observation	2015 upon conclusion of general elections
Output 2.1: EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks enhanced to support the holding of credible elections (aggregate outcome of sub-outputs 2.1.1—2.1.6)					
Sub-output 2. 1. 1 **Improved capacity of EMBs to undertaken planning**	Evidence of key plans and policies developed by the EMBs Quality of the plans and policies developed (clarity in details and implementation strategy)	EU report: NEC and ZEC should have a detailed elections calendar. 2010: poor coordination between the operational units of NEC	key plans and policies developed in a timely manner, are well detailed and have a clear implementation strategy	***Source***: EMB reports, DEP reports, Observer reports ***Method***: Documents review	Quarterly Election Management Specialists

Sub-output 2.1.2 **Inclusive business policies and processes developed by EMBs to facilitate the engagement of women, youth and PWDs in electoral processes.**	Evidence of measures developed by EMBs to enhance inclusivity -development of gender & social inclusion policies -revision to existing policies, processes & codes of conduct to mainstream gender & social inclusion principles	In 2010, EMBs did not have a gender policy nor a gender mainstreaming strategy.	Gender Policies developed by the EMBs Gender & social inclusion principles mainstreamed in EMB policies, plans and processes.	***Source***: EMB reports, UN Women reports ***Method***: Documents review	Quarterly Election Management Specialists
Sub-output 2.1.3 **Areas for EMBs capacity strengthening identified and strategic response plan developed**	capacity needs assessment conducted for both EMBs action plans developed to address the gaps	Reports following the 2010 elections indicated the need to strengthen the capacity of the EMBs. A capacity needs assessment will help identify the specific areas for capacity strengthening. - In 2010, EMBs had limited capacity to develop an integrated Electoral Management Plan. - EU Report: there is need for the EMBs to have detailed election calendars and for transparency in results management to build public confidence in the electoral process - TACCEO: Improved training of election officials is needed.	EMBs capacity gaps identified, priority areas for capacity strengthening established and response plan developed	**Source**: Capacity Needs Assessment Reports, EMB reports **Method**: Documents Review.	Quarterly Election Management Specialists
	Evidence of trainings delivered to EMBs in response to identified capacity gaps - type of training, number of participants per EMB		Trainings delivered to EMBs to address the identified capacity gaps		Quarterly Election Management Specialists
Sub Output 2.1.4 **Feasibility Study undertaken to facilitate NEC's decentralization**	Evidence of conduct of feasibility study	NEC's current structure is centralized and there have been calls upon NEC to decentralize 2010: NEC relied on seconded staff and lacked the power and authority to employ and dismiss staff thus undermining its independence.	Feasibility study conducted and options for NEC's decentralisation established	**Source**: Feasibility Study Report, NEC reports ***Method***: Documents review	Quarterly Election Management Specialist

Sub Output 2.1.5 **EMBs supported to establish performance monitoring systems**	Delivery of M&E training for EMB staff - # of staff trained per EMB (sex disaggregated) Establishment of an M&E system for the EMBs	No formal M&E systems in the EMBs. M&E conducted informally EMBs have limited knowledge on M&E DEP's Capacity Needs Assessment of both EMBs identified M&E as an area	Key EMB staff[2] sensitized on M&E M&E system established for at least 1 EMB	***Source***: EMBs reports, DEP reports ***Method***: Documents review	Quarterly Election Management Specialist/ Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
		requiring capacity strengthening for both EMBs			
Sub output 2.1.6 **Targeted voter education focusing on women, youth and PWDs delivered with extended reach to hard to reach areas/marginalised communities)**	Evidence of development and dissemination of voter education content targeting women, youth and PWDs # of voter education materials produced and disseminated	1,200,000 booklets including Citizens Guides, 3 million posters and 15 million leaflets targeting women, youth and persons with disabilities were printed and distributed for both the Union and Zanzibar elections (ESP Annual Report 2010) Low participation of women, youth and PWDs in electoral process Need for voter education encouraging women, youth and PWDs to participate in electoral processes	Voter education messages targeting women, youth and PWDs developed and disseminated in a timely manner	**Data source**: EMBs reports, UNESCO reports, media reports, observer reports **Methods**: Documents review	Quarterly Election Management Specialists
	Estimated population reached by the voter education (i.e. via community radios, TV spots, billboards, newspaper ads…)		Voter education messages delivered with extended reach to hard-to-reach areas/marginalized communities		
	level of public satisfaction with information received from the voter education campaigns - clarity of messages, content of the VE messages,	N/A	At least 80% of respondents satisfied with the information received from the VE campaigns		

[2] Heads of departments, staff involved in monitoring and reporting and M&E focal points

[3] Technical acceptance plan; testing and integration plan; logistics plan

Sub-output 2.2.1 **Increased capacity of EMB staff to apply ICT in their roles within the electoral cycle**	Evidence of ICT equipment and election management software solutions delivered to EMBs - number and type of equipment/software delivered per EMB	EMBs lack adequate ICT equipment/skills to effectively undertake their work	ICT equipment and software solutions delivered to EMBs in line with identified need	***Source***: EMB reports, DEP reports ***Method***: Inventory Review, document review	Quarterly ICT Specialist
	Delivery of training for EMB staff in application of ICT equipment/software solutions. Level of confidence of the staff trained to apply ICT in their work		EMB staff have the requisite skills to apply the ICT delivered in their work At least 80% of staff trained express high confidence in applying ICT in their work	***Source***: EMB reports, training reports ***Method***: Documents review, Pre & post training survey	Quarterly ICT Specialist
Sub-Output 2.2.2 **EMBs supported to operationalize biometric voter registration technology**	Evidence of the development and implementation of key BVR plans[3]	Government of Tanzania made a decision to have all eligible voters registered afresh using the BVR technology for them to vote in the 2015 general elections	key BVR plans developed and implemented in the reception and roll out of the BVR technology	***Source***: EMB reports, DEP reports ***Method***: Document review.	Quarterly ICT Specialist
Sub Output 2.2.3 **Credible voter register established**	Evidence of audit of the voter register	In 2010 the PNVR at the lower levels remained outdated and incorrect. An independent and transparent technical assessment of ZEC's voter register conducted in thereby enhancing stakeholder confidence in ZEC's voter register (ESP 2010 Annual Report)	Independent audit of the voter register conducted	***Source***: EMB report, audit report ***Method***: Document review.	upon completion of voter registration. Election Management Specialist & ICT Specialist
	# of duplicate/multiple cases identified and # of duplicate cases resolved.	In 2010 NEC identified at least 2000 double registration cases; whereas ZEC identified at least 3,400 cases.	Duplicate/multiple registrations identified and addressed in a timely manner - # of cases identified & number resolved	***Source***: EMB reports ***Method***: Documents review	upon completion of voter registration. Election Management Specialist & ICT Specialist

	Level of confidence of key stakeholders in the integrity of the voter register	The PNVR at the lower levels remained outdated and incorrect in 2010	80% confidence rate	**Source**: Survey reports **Method**: perception surveys	Upon completion of the voter registration exercise Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
Sub-output 2.2.4 **Professional capacity of EMB staff Strengthened (BRIDGE training & exchange visits)**	# of BRIDGE modules delivered # of participants trained per module (disaggregated by sex, EMB) # of BRIDGE semi-accredited facilitators becoming fully accredited (sex disaggregated)	Observers and Analysts have questioned the professional capacity of EMB staff Tanzania has very few election experts who are BRIDGE accredited facilitators	Increased capacity of EMB staff to undertake their work in a professional manner	**Source**: EMB reports, training reports **Method**: document review	Quarterly Elections Management Specialist
	Level of confidence of EMB staff trained to apply the knowledge and skills acquired from BRIDGE trainings		80% of those trained express high confidence	**Source**: Training reports **Method**: Pre & post training survey	Quarterly Elections Management Specialist
	Evidence of EMBs' engagement in study missions/exchange programmes	Observers and Analysts have questioned the professional capacity of EMB staff	EMB staff highlight improved knowledge, skills and experience from the study missions	**Source**: Mission reports, EMB reports, **Method**: document review, observation	Quarterly Elections Management Specialist
Surveys undertaken to assess public understanding of democratic values, confidence in democratic institutions, desire to engage in political discourse (Activity Cancelled)	% of respondents who demonstrate understanding of democratic values, have confidence in democratic institutions and desire to engage in democratic processes (disaggregated by sex, age, who self-identify with disability, region).	Cancelled	Cancelled	Cancelled	

Support to community media to serve as a voice for democratic accountability & voter information					
Sub-output 2.2.5 **Strengthened Capacity of community radios to report on elections and**	# of community radios supported by the project - support includes establishment of the radio	2010: UNDP in partnership with UNESCO supported community radios in 12 districts i.e. 12 community radios (ESP 2010 Annual Report)	Increase number of community radios supported from 12 to 25	***Source***: UNESCO reports,	Quarterly UNESCO
political issues in a non-partisan, ethical and inclusive manner.	station; training and mentoring of community radio practitioners, support in the development of quality of programming tools and editorial policies…. Estimated population reached by DEP supported community radios			***Method***: Documents review, field monitoring visit	
	# of community radio practitioners trained (sex disaggregated data)	Capacity of community radio practitioners to report on elections and political issues in an ethical, inclusive and objective manner requires strengthening	At least 250 community radio practitioners trained in ethical, objective and inclusive reporting	***Source***: UNESCO reports ***Method***: Documents review	Quarterly UNESCO
Sub-output 2.2.6 **Enhanced EMB - Observers Engagement**	Effectiveness in coordination of election observation - observer Engagement Strategy in place - codes of Conduct for observers revised - establishment of observer centres	There was poor flow of information between NEC and observers in 2010 In an effort to engage stakeholders, ZEC held a workshop for election observation stakeholders with the aim of going through the Guidelines for Election Observers applied in the past elections	EMBs effectively coordinate observer missions - observer engagement strategies developed and implemented in a timely manner - observer accreditation centres established and running 3 months prior to the elections	**Source*:*** EMBs reports **Methods*:*** document review, observation	Quarterly Election Management Specialist

	Observer Management System (OMS) developed Evidence of use of the system in observer accreditation in 2015 general elections - # of domestic and international observers accredited by NEC & ZEC (sex disaggregated)	2010: **NEC**: 2,700 domestic observers & 454 international observers registered **ZEC**: 1,233 domestic observers & 200 international observers accredited	Observer Accreditation System developed and used by the EMBs in the 2015 general elections	***Source***: EMB reports, Database of observers, ***Method***: Documents review/review of OMS database	
	Observers' level of satisfaction with information received and support provided through the observer accreditation centres e.g. quality of information received, e a s e of accreditation process (online/manual), receipt of observer cards, codes of conduct…	There was poor flow of information between NEC and observers in 2010	At least 80% express high level of satisfaction	**Source:** EMB reports, observer reports **Method**: Documents review	

Component no. 3: Support Inclusive[1] Participation in Electoral and Political Processes

Two key medium-term results anticipated in this Component:

Output 3.1: Increased number of women, youth and Persons with Disabilities (PWD) seeking political party nominations in 2015 elections

Output 3.2: Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media and community-based organizations) promote the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in party leadership and nominations.

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Method for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
3.1. Increased number of women, youth[2] and PWDs[3] seeking political party nominations[4] in 2015 elections.	# of women, youth and PWDs (aspirants)seeking nomination as candidates # of women, youth & PWDs nominated as candidates in 2015 general elections - # of those trained that get nominated	2010: Few women, youth and PWDs sought nomination as candidates by political parties. Some parties had to approach them and convince them to seek nomination. 2010: Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD) report: *baseline survey on nomination of women aspirants:* CCM 8.8 % (118 women nominated of 1345 total)	Increase number of women, youth & PWDs seeking nomination by 10%	**Source**: UN Women reports, EMB reports, observer reports **Method**: Document review	Annually UN Women

[1] Inclusive refers to the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWD) in electoral and political processes.

[2] As defined by Government of Tanzania and as applicable to voting age: 18 to 35 years old.

[3] Disabilities as defined by Section 3 of the Persons with Disabilities Act (Government of Tanzania, 2010): *an individual limitation or loss of opportunity to take part in the normal life of the community on an equal level due to physical, mental or social factors.*

[4] Seeking nomination for DEP purposes is defined as: "*identified and applied for party nomination*".

		TLP 24.5 % (13 women nominated out of 53 candidates) NCCR 31.3 % (21 women nominated out of 67 candidates) Percentage of women of total: 10,4 % *Aspiring nomination youth:* CCM 3.6 % 48/1345 total TLP 11.3% 6/53 total. NCCR 4.1% 6 / 67 total. Percentage of aspiring youth of total: 4.1% ***Aspiring nomination of PWDs: 0%***			
Output 3.2 Political parties, media and community-based organizations promote the participation of women, youth and PWDs in political leadership and nominations.	Evidence of initiatives adopted by political parties to promote the participation of women, youth and PWDs (e.g. revision of political party instruments; revision of nomination procedures, internal political party communication, Codes of Conduct for nominees/candidates)	2010 elections: no solid mechanisms to ensure inclusion of women. Participation involved providing trainings to women, community leaders, religious groups, and political parties.	Political parties implement measures promoting inclusiveness in leadership and party nominations	**Source**: UN Women reports, ORPP reports, media reports **Method:** Document review, Expert Assessment of political party instrument review.	Quarterly UN Women
	Extended reach of DEP supported-media messaging promoting the participation of women, youth & PWDs	2010: 12 community radios supported to promote gender and social inclusion	25 community radios supported to promote gender and social inclusion in political leadership and nominations	**Source**: UNESCO reports, UN Women reports, media monitors reports **Method**: Document review	Quarterly

	Pronouncements by political party leaders/community leaders on their support for women, youth and PWDs as candidates in 2015 general elections		Political party leaders and community leaders publicly declare their support for women, youth and PWDs as candidates	**Source**: UN Women reports, Media reports **Method**: Document review, content analysis	Quarterly UN Women
Output 3.1 Increased number of women, youth and Persons with Disabilities (PWD) seeking political party nominations in 2015 elections (The aggregate result of sub-output activities below (Sub-output 3.1.1 – 3.1.2)					
Sub output 3.1.1. **Database of aspirants (women, youth and PWDs) established.**	mapping exercise finalized # of aspirants in the database (disaggregated by sex, age & disability status)	2010: No database of aspirants in place	Potential aspirants identified and database of aspirants established by mid-term	**Source**: UN Women reports, Capacity Mapping Report **Method**: documents review	Quarterly UN Women
Sub-output 3.1.2 **Increased capacity of aspirants (women, youth and PWDs) to engage in electoral processes.**	# of aspirants trained (disaggregated by sex, age & disability status)	Aspirants lack adequate capacity to effectively engage in electoral processes	All identified aspirants in database trained	**Source:** Training reports, UN Women reports **Method**: Documents review	Quarterly UN Women
	% of aspirants trained who express increased skills and knowledge to engage in electoral processes		80% of aspirants trained express increased skills and knowledge to engage in electoral process	**Source**: UN Women reports/training reports **Method**: Pre & post training survey.	Quarterly UN Women
Output 3.2: Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media and community-based organizations) promote the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in party leadership and nominations (The aggregate result of sub-outputs 3.2.1 – 3.2.3)					
Political party support for women, PWDs and youth					

Sub output 3.2.1 **Increased capacity of political party officials to promote gender and social inclusion in electoral processes**	# of political party officials trained in gender and social inclusion (disaggregated by sex,		2 officials per political party trained	**Source**: UNW reports, ORPP reports,	Quarterly
	age, disability status, political party)			**Method:** documents review	UN Women
	% of party officials trained highlighting increase in knowledge and skills		80% of party officials trained highlight increased skills and knowledge to promote gender and social inclusion in electoral processes.	**Source**: UN Women reports, Training report **Method**: document review, pre & post training survey	
Sub-Output 3.2.2 **Increased awareness of CBOs on gender and social inclusion with particular focus on women, youth and PWDs**	# of training sessions held for community-based organization on inclusive electoral process Strategies developed by CBOs to promote engagement of women, youth and PWDs in electoral processes	TGNP (pages 9, 10): *"civic education does not appear to be a priority of most of these community/faith based organizations. 65% of these stakeholders said they did not implement any civic education activities in 2010."*		**Source**: UN Women reports **Method**: Documents review	Quarterly UN Women
	level of confidence of key stakeholders in the leadership ability of women, youth & PWDs as candidates in 2015 general elections	The leadership abilities of women, youth and PWDs were perceived to be very high in 2010.	80% of respondents express high confidence	**Sources**: survey report **Method**: pre & post elections perception survey	Pre & Post elections period Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
Sub-output 3.2.3 **Increased knowledge and skills of media practitioners (journalists) to report on electoral issues in a non-partisan, ethical and inclusive manner**	# of media practitioners trained % of media outlets trained that increase coverage on issues related to women, youth and PWDs' leadership and participation in electoral processes.	2010: 125 community radio broadcasters trained (ESP 2010 Annual Report)	At least 30 journalists from 28 media outlets trained	**Source**: UN Women reports **Method**: document review	Quarterly UN Women

Component 4: Support National Peace Infrastructure to Mitigate and Resolve Election-Related Conflict

Two key medium-term results anticipated in this Component:

Output 4.1: Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (National Police) to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events.

Output 4.2: Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections.

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Method for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
<u>Output 4.1</u>: Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (National Police) to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events.	Reduction in reports of excessive use of force and violation of human rights by the police in responding to election related events (2015 general elections)	2010: Police accused of being partisan, using excessive force & human rights violation in responding to election-related incidents of disruption to public order	Police apply appropriate response[1] to incidents of disruption to public order	**Source**: TPF reports, Media reports, observers reports **Method**: documents review	Annually Community Dialogue Specialist
	Evidence of use of the Incident Reporting and Response System (IRRS) by the police to track and respond to electoral related incidents - # of election-related incidents of disruptions to public order tracked and responded to in the Incident Reporting and Response System (V4M)[2]	2010: Radio communication equipment delivered to Tanzania Police. Reported incidents logged in manually in 2010. IRRS introduced late in the project and not utilized because no training of police on IRSS was provided	IRRS operational by 2015 general elections and used by police to track and respond to electoral related incidents	**Source**: Police reports, IRRS database/complaint register, observer reports, media reports **Method**: documents review	Annually Community Dialogue Specialist

[1] no excessive use of force and no violation of human rights

[2] A separate case study will be undertaken to review different elements of Value for Money of the installation of radio communication system and the Incident Reporting and Response System. The equipment was introduced under ESP and work will continue under DEP to expand its use and, in particular, support the police's need for measurable, clear data on incidents

	Level of confidence of key stakeholders in the police to respond to election-related incidents	In 2010, the public's level of confidence in the TPF was low. Police were viewed as instigators of violence during elections.	80% of respondents express high confidence level	**Source**: Survey Reports(DEP surveys, CSO surveys, media reports, observer reports **Method**: surveys, documents review	Annually M&E Specialist /Community Dialogue Specialist
<u>Output 4.2:</u> Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections.	Establishment of multi-stakeholders' dialogue forums on peaceful elections active engagement of stakeholders in the dialogue forums	No forum in place for regular engagement and collaboration amongst electoral stakeholders Some districts have been identified as hotspots for election-related conflict	Continued engagement of stakeholders in dialogue forums potential conflicts addressed in a timely manner	**Source**: reports by implementing partners, media reports, studies by DEP **Method**: Documents Review	Annually Community Dialogue Specialist
Output 4.1: Strengthened capacities of the Police to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events (*aggregate outcome of sub outputs- 4.1.1 – 4.1.2)*					
Sub output 4.1.1 **Increased capacity of the police to maintain public order in elections related events**	# of police trained in: public order command; Gender & Human Rights (disaggregated by sex, geographical location – Mainland/Zanzibar	In 2010, the police were accused of excessive use of force in responding to incidents of disruption to public order	At least 20 police officers trained as TOT in public order command At least 30 high level and 200 mid-level officers trained in public order command At least 10,000 officers nationwide trained in Gender & Human Rights	**Source**: Training reports **Method**: Documents review	Quarterly Community Dialogue Specialist
	% of police officers trained highlighting increase in skills and knowledge		80% and above highlight increased skills and knowledge	**Source**: Training reports **Method**: pre & post training surveys	Quarterly Community Dialogue Specialist
Sub-output 4.1.2	coverage range of police radio communication	2010: Police criticized for not responding adequately to incidents reported (slow	All districts and regions (including newly created ones) covered by the	**Source**: TPF reports, case study report, media reports, observer reports	Quarterly

reported nation-wide. The original concept of the technology was to serve election-related needs however there are advantages to communication which extend to the entire range of police work and public order issues.

Increased capacity of the police to track and respond to electoral related incidents	systems (# of districts and regions covered)	response, excessive use of force) Radio communication equipment provided to the police under UNDP's Electoral Support Project. New districts have been created since then and will require radio communication equipment.	radio communication systems	**Method**: Documents review, value-for-money Case Study	Community Dialogue Specialist
	# of police trained in use of IRSS system	2010: IRRS introduced towards the end of the project but was not used since staff were not trained on its application	At least 25 police operators trained on all operational aspects of the IRRS	**Source**: TPF reports, training reports **Method**: documents review, Case Study	Quarterly Community Dialogue Specialist
Output 4.2: Strengthened Collaboration Among Key Partners to Mitigate Risks to Peaceful Elections					
Sub output 4.2.1 **Strengthened dialogue platforms to reduce and manage tensions and build confidence in the electoral process**	# of dialogue conveners trained # of dialogue forums held (national level/district level) # of participants per dialogue forums ((disaggregated by sex, age, category of stakeholder)	In 2010, 62 meetings were conducted in Zanzibar to bring together the police, the Electoral Commission, the Office of the Mufti, youth, local political leaders, religious leaders, teachers, the media, local officials and other citizens for a discussion on peace building	At least 30 dialogue conveners trained on convening & facilitating peace dialogues At least 5 national dialogues held with different stakeholders Dialogues held in at least 10 districts (pre & post-election period)	**Source**: Reports from dialogue forums **Method**: Documents review	Quarterly Community Dialogue Specialist

Component 5: Project Management and Advisory Services

One key medium-term result anticipated in this component:

Output 5.1. UNDP effectively manages DEP project operations and program delivery.

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Method for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
Output 5.1 UNDP effectively manages project operations and project delivery.	Timeliness and quality in project delivery - Timeliness & quality of project reports - Regular TC & SC meetings held		Project reports (e.g. quarterly & annual reports) delivered on time and are of high quality At least one TC & one SC meeting held per Quarter	**Sources**: Project reports, Minutes of TC & SC meetings **Methods**: Document review	Quarterly Project Manager /M&E specialist
	Level of satisfaction (%) of Development Partners with information (quality & timeliness) provided in the - Quarterly/annual project reports - Technical /Steering committee meetings		80% satisfaction rate	**Sources**: Evaluation reports, feedback from Technical Committee & Steering Committee meetings, **Method**: project's mid-term/final evaluation	Quarterly Project Manager/M&E specialist
	Level of satisfaction (%) of implementing partners with technical support provided by the project (NEC, ZEC, Judiciary, ORPP, Police)			**Sources**: Evaluation reports, feedback from Technical Committee & Steering Committee meetings **Methods**: project's mid-term/final evaluation	Quarterly Project Manager/M&E specialist
Sub-output 5.1.1	procurement of goods and services in accordance to UNDP rules	N/A	All procurement of goods and services by	**Sources**: DEP progress reports, Project evaluation Reports & Audit report	Quarterly

Hierarchy of Results	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Sources of data/Method for Data Collection	Frequency/Person Responsible
Project procurement undertaken in a transparent and efficient manner	- open and competitive procurement process - best value for money obtained against specified		the project adhere to UNDP rules Unqualified audit report	**Methods**: documents review	Project Manager & Operations Manager
	requirements				
Sub-output 5.1.2 Sustainability considered in project operations from ESP 2010 to DEP 2013	Evidence of ongoing use of the radio communication system (RCS) and related Incident Reporting and Response System(IRRS) by Tanzania Police Force	Radio communication equipment procured in 2010 and the IRRS introduced but limitations of time did not allow for adequate training and integration of the IRRS with the RCS.	At least 80% usage rate of radio communication equipment provided and IRRS used in 2015 general elections	**Sources**: TPF reports, Case study report, technical assessment reports **Methods**: documents review	Annually Project Manager

Annex 1: Persons Met

S/N	Name	Designation	Organisation
1	Rashid Yusuph Mchenga	Publicity Secretary	ADA TADEA
2	Asha Abould	Chairperson	Association of NGOs Zanzibar
3	Nadra Mohamed	Deputy Secretary Organisations	CCM
4	Helen Barnes	Governance Advisor	DFID
5	Aran Corrigan	Senior Governance Advisor	Embassy of Ireland
6	Anna Bwana	Governance Advisor	Embassy of Ireland
7	Widholm Bolme	Democratic Governance	Embassy of Sweden
8	Sonya Elmer Dettelbacher	Head of Governance and Political Officer	Embassy of Switzerland
9	Anna Costantini	Programme Officer, Economic and Governance Section	European Union
10	Olivier Coupleux	Head of Section, Economic Governance	European Union
11	Amabilis Batamula	Media Director	Femina Hip
12	Costancia A Mgimwa	Community Mobilisation Senior Person	Femina Hip
13	Nik Bredholt	Coordinator	Zanzibar Interfaith Centre
14	Thomas Goda	Executive Director	IRCPT
15	Naem Silayo	M&E Officer	LHRC
16	Castor Kalemera	M&E Specialist	LHRC
17	Ali Masoud Kombo	Manager	Micheweni FM, Community Radio
18	Shaaban Ali	Accountant (DEP Focal Point)	Mtegani FM, Community Radio
19	Honourable Justice (Rtd) Damian Lubuva	Chairperson	National Electoral Commission
20	Honourable Justice (Rtd) Longwe	Commissioner	National Electoral Commission
21	Giveness Aswile	Information and voter education	National Electoral Commission
22	Angaza Mwipopo	Legal service	National Electoral Commission
23	Adolf Kinyeru	IT Department	National Electoral Commission
24	Rose Malo	Voter education	National Electoral Commission
25	Adam Nyando	Election management	National Electoral Commission
26	Hassan Lakini	Policy and planning	

27	Sheikh Soraga	Secretary General	Office of the Mufti Zanzibar
28	Haji Habib	Special Assistant	Office of the Mufti Zanzibar
29	Mussa	Accountant	Office of the Mufti Zanzibar
30	Honorable Justice Francis Mutungi	Registrar of Political Parties	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
31	Marco Sanga	Program Officer	TAMWA
32	Mzuri Issa Ali	Coordinator, Zanzibar	TAMWA Zanzibar
33	Daniel P. Loya	Executive Director	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
34	Bernadeta Kafuko	Programme Officer	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
35	Likele Shungu	Programme Officer, Interparty Dialogue	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
36	Lawrence L. Malawa	Finance Officer	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
37	Grace Kisetu	Programme Manager, Activism and Movement Building	Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
38	Mussa Ali Mussa	Senior Commissioner of Police	Tanzania Police
39	Goodluck Kessy	Police Trainer	Tanzania Police
40	Mohamed Songora	Accountant	Tanzania Police
41	Protas Mutayoba	Assistant Commissioner of Police, Radio Communication Expert	Tanzania Police
42	Richard Makome	Superintendent of Police	Tanzania Police
43	Mohamed Khamis	IT for Incident Reporting and Response System	Tanzania Police
44	Ali Khamis Mtwana	Executive Director	Tumbatu FM, Community Radio
45	Ave Maria Semakafu	Executive Director	TWCP/ULINGO
46	Maria Karadenizli	Representative a.i.	UN WOMEN
47	Sara Negrao	DEP, Election Specialist, Gender and Social Inclusion Program Manager	UN WOMEN DEP
47	Fortunata Chuwa	Former Inclusion Analyst DEP	UN WOMEN DEP
48	Yahya Ba	Deputy Country Director, Operations	UNDP
49	Godfrey Mulisa	Governance Practice Specialist	UNDP
50	Mads Hove	Programme Analyst	UNDP
51	Bazil James	Procurement Support Unit	UNDP
52	Erick Mutale	Procurement	UNDP
53	Nirina Kiplagat	Acting DEP Project Manager	UNDP DEP
54	Mercy Mungai	M&E Specialist, DEP	UNDP DEP

55	Thomas Crick	Former DEP Project Manager - by Skype	UNDP DEP
56	Joram Rukambe	Former Chief Technical Advisor, DEP - by Skype	UNDP DEP
57	Julian Dsilva	UN Volunteer, Former Project Officer, DEP	UNDP DEP
58	Lawrence Robertson	Consultant for Conflict Assessment, DEP- by email	UNDP DEP
59	Hashim Pondeza	DEP, Community Dialogue Analyst, Zanzibar	UNDP DEP
60	Fidelis Luteganya	Finance Analyst	UNDP DEP
61	Irene Mnzava	Finance and Administration Associates	UNDP DEP
62	Peter Lyimo	ICT Associate	UNDP DEP
63	William Hogan	Former Election Management Specialist (Dar es Salaam)- by email	UNDP DEP
64	Clement Gba	Former Operations Manager DEP by Skype	UNDP DEP
65	Rindai Chipfunde-Vava	BRIDGE Trainer - by email	UNDP DEP
66	Abraham Rugo Muriu	Team-building facilitator - by email	UNDP DEP
67	Zefanias Matsimbe	BRIDGE Trainer - by email	UNDP DEP
68	Michael Chajes	Former ICT Specialist/Voter Registration Expert- by email	UNDP DEP
69	John Maphephe	ICT Project Officer - by email	UNDP DEP
70	Jeffrey Rudeloff	Consultant- by email	UNDP DEP
71	Cheselden George V. Carmona	Consultant - by email	UNDP DEP
72	Efrem Beraki	IT Programmer DEP Consultant - by email	UNDP DEP
73	Tom Ankers	ICT Consultant for IRRS by email	UNDP DEP
74	Aleida Ferreyra	Electoral Policy Specialist, Inclusive Political Processes, Governance and Peacebuilding, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, by email	UNDP NY
75	Christophe Legay	Head of Unit/ Programme Manager, Communication information Sector	UNESCO
76	Rose Haji Mwalimu	Media Specialist	UNESCO
77	Jessica Ayisha	M&E Specialist	UNESCO
78	Colm Allan	Independent Evaluator for UNESCO's DEP Component by Skype and email	UNESCO DEP
79	Courtney Ivins	Technical Support Consultant for DEP Component by email	UNESCO DEP
80	Alvaro Rodriguez	Resident Coordinator of the UN System	United Nations
81	Sead Alihodzic	Program Officer by email	International IDEA

82	Saada Salum Issa	Programme Officer	ZAFELA Zanzibar
83	Donald Godwin Navetta	Operations Manager	Zanzibar Association of the Disabled (UWZ)
84	Nik Redholt	Coordinator, Zanzibar	Zanzibar Interfaith Centre
85	Kombo Khamis	Regional Crime Officer	Zanzibar Police
86	Samia Seif Khalfan	Member of the Executive Committee	ZAYONET
87	Jecha Salim Jecha	Chairperson	ZEC
88	Salum Ali	Director of Elections	ZEC
89	Juma Haji Ussi	IT Manager	ZEC
90	Saadun Ahmed Khamis	Head of Division, Administration and Operations	ZEC
91	Juma Sanifu Sheha	Voter Education Officer	ZEC
92	Idrisa Haji Jecha	Elections Officer	ZEC
93	Khamis Issa Khamis	Legal Advisor	ZEC

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Annex 4: Evaluation Inception Plan

1. Introduction

This draft Evaluation Inception Plan was developed based on: the Terms of Reference (TOR) prepared by UNDP Tanzania for this independent final evaluation of the Democratic Empowerment Programme in Tanzania; information provided by UNDP Tanzania and the DEP Project management team; UNDP evaluation guidelines; and, an initial review of the project documents and reporting.

1.1. Purpose for the Terminal Evaluation

The purpose for this final evaluation is to provide UNDP with a final evaluation report on the DEP project. This was a three-year (2013-2016) USD 22.5 million project intended to enhance the credibility and capacity of key democratic institutions in Tanzania to effectively implement their electoral and political functions. Specifically this evaluation will:

3. Assess the relevance, efficiency, performance and sustainability of the project interventions taking into consideration the project objectives; and,
4. Examine the appropriateness of the form of assistance provided, with a view to draw lessons and make recommendations for future election support programming through the cycle to the 2020 General Election.

1.1 Background and context

DEP supported the political and electoral processes and key related democratic institutions in Tanzania from 2013 to 2016 in their work to organize an anticipated constitutional referendum and the 2015 general elections. The DEP project included a basket fund that pooled funding from 12 development partners: Canada/CIDA (USD 2.9m), Denmark (USD 1.2m), European Union (USD 5.1m), Finland (USD 0.9m), Ireland (USD 0.6m), Norway (USD 0.99m), Sweden (USD 3.3m), Switzerland (USD 1.9m), UK/DFID (USD 3.9m) and UNDP (USD 1m). The project was almost fully funded.

DEP focused on four main areas: (i) supporting legal and institutional reform for credible elections; (ii) supporting improvement of electoral management body (EMB) integrity and management capacity; (iii) promoting inclusive participation in political and electoral processes; and, (iv) supporting national peace infrastructure to mitigate and resolve election-related conflicts. This project follows a successful UNDP Election Support Project (2009 -2011) and sought to assist a broader group of actors in the democracy building arena in the Mainland and Zanzibar. Its intended partners were the EMBs, the Constitutional Review Commission and the Registrar of Political Parties (RPP) for electoral reform and more inclusive participation; political parties, civil society and media for more effective engagement with democratic processes; and the police and judiciary to strengthen election-related conflict mitigation and dispute resolution.[87]

The project has nine intended outputs that were expected to contribute towards the achievement of its anticipated outcomes. These outputs are:

1. Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to contribute to the holding of inclusive and credible elections;
2. Legal and institutional policies and systems reformed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes;
3. EMBs planning, management and execution of key tasks enhanced to support the holding of credible elections;
4. EMB systems and procedures enhanced to facilitate more inclusive participation and transparency of elections;

[87] DEP Project Document, p 17

5. Increased number of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWD)s seeking political party nominations in 2015 elections;
6. Targeted stakeholders (political party officials, media and community-based organizations) promote the participation of women, youth and PWD in party leadership and nominations;
7. Strengthened capacities of key stakeholders (National Police) to maintain the security and integrity of electoral events;
8. Strengthened collaboration among key partners to mitigate risks to peaceful elections; and,
9. UNDP effectively manages DEP project operations and program delivery.

The project is executed through a direct implementation modality (DIM) intended to support national management and coordination structures. It has a Project Steering Committee responsible for project oversight, with guidance provided by a Chief Technical Adviser, a Project Manger and Project Management Team. It had a midterm evaluation done in August 2015.

1.2 Scope of the evaluation

This independent evaluation will:

- Undertake a review of relevant documents, including the DEP Project Document, Midterm Evaluation Report, progress reports, project products and electoral observation mission reports.
- Undertake discussions with the government and non-government agencies, project stakeholders and project partners on the project design, implementation, performance, challenges, lessons learned and results.
- Assess the relevance, efficiency, performance and sustainability of the project interventions taking into consideration the project objectives.
- Verify qualitative and quantitative data on the results achieved and progress made.
- Evaluate the extent to which the project applied a gender perspective and the human rights-based approach, and assess the results of the intervention for men and women.
- Identify the factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of results and the lessons learned during implementation.
- Assess the programme strategy/approach and management arrangements in terms of achievement of results.
- Validate and discuss preliminary evaluation findings through a stakeholder workshop.
- Provide recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of future UNDP and development partner electoral assistance.

2 Methodology

2.1 Evaluation criteria and questions

With the evaluations scope detailed in Section 1.2 in mind, the evaluation team will seek to answer the following questions:

Outcome	Main Questions	Sub- Questions
Legal and institutional reform for credible elections	• Were the institutional and legal frameworks strengthened/reformed as a result of DEP? In what ways? How did this impact the electoral process? • Did DEP assistance strengthen political party engagement in electoral processes? Did this improve the credibility of the process? • Were the 2013-2016 electoral processes and institutions more credible as a result of DEP support?	• Did DEP help increase dialogue between EMBs, political parties and other actors? Did this affect the electoral process? How? • Were electoral disputes resolved peacefully by authorities and parties and what was the role and contribution of DEP in this? • What remains to be done to strengthen the legal and institutional frameworks? • What was the outcome of the work with political parties?
Strengthened EMB	• Were the EMBs better able to plan, manage	• What is the perception among EMBs and

Outcome	Main Questions	Sub- Questions
capacity to conduct credible elections	and execute their plans? Did this help improve the quality of the elections? Why or why not? • Was the voter registry perceived as credible and complete? What was DEP's contribution to this? • Were the results management systems improved? What was DEP's contribution? • Were EMBs more inclusive, participatory and transparent with stakeholders? Did this increase the credibility of the 2013 - 2016 electoral process? • What was the level of ownership and participation by the EMBs in the DEP project? What were the most important factors for this?	stakeholders/voters on the voter registry? Remaining issues? • Did EMB voter education efforts target women, youth and PWDs? Did it make a difference with participation? • What was DEP's contribution to EMB ICT management capabilities? How did this affect the electoral processes? • Usefulness and level of participation of community radios and CSOs in 2013-2016 electoral processes? • Was there increased coordination between observers and EMBs as a result of DEP assistance? How did this help the process? • What are EMB/stakeholders/observer perceptions of EMB capacity? Did this improve a result of DEP assistance?
Strengthened inclusive participation in electoral and political processes	• Was there an increase in women, youth and PWD seeking/gaining nominations from 2013 - 2016 as a result of DEP? Why? How did this affect the process? • Did community radio highlight participation and leadership of women, youth and PWD in electoral processes? Did this have an effect on the process?	• Did parties and CSOs promote the inclusion of women, youth and PWD in the electoral process and leadership roles? How? Effect? • What is the biggest constraint to more inclusive participation in electoral and political processes in Tanzania and did DEP address these?
Supported national peace infrastructure to mitigate and resolve election-related conflict	• Were the police able to remain impartial and provide a safe electoral environment? How did DEP contribute to this? • Was there a reduction of elections-related violence from 2013 - 2016? What were the factors? Did this affect participation and credibility of the processes?	• Was there increased collaboration among key stakeholders to mitigate risks to peaceful elections? Is it still operating in post-electoral context? • Have the police improved their human rights record in relation to political and electoral affairs? Is this related to DEP? • Is the radio network still operating? • Are the peace dialogue mechanisms still working?
UNDP effectively manages DEP project operations and program delivery	• What were the key factors that affected DEP's performance and how did this impact project implementation? • How sustainable are DEP results? • What were the lessons learned in the DEP project?	• Was the project well designed? Did it target the most critical issues? • What was DEP's role in the electoral process and was this appropriate? • Were there implementation issues? If so, what where they and how were they overcome (or not)? • Were risks adequately identified and addressed in design/implementation? • Quality of coordination and reporting?

2.2. Approach

In answering the evaluation questions, the evaluation team will use mixed methods for analysis, synthesis and drawing conclusions. These include: trend analysis of key outcomes, analysis of associations between observed outcome and the DEP-funded efforts, assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of DEP's assistance and validation through triangulation (validation discussions with UNDP, EMBs, DEP donors, staff and its main partners/beneficiaries, by information provided in the documents reviewed and by the quality of the electoral processes reported by impartial national/international observers). As the DEP work started in 2013 and had a slow start, results are more likely to be found at the output level rather than outcome. As a result,

based on the information available and stakeholder perceptions, the evaluation team will make judgments on their value and the extent that these outputs contributed towards the achievement of the DEP outcomes.

The questions outlined in Section 1.2 are specific yet general enough to allow for flexibility in questioning as well as to allow for flexibility in responses. This will enable the responders to voice their own issues and concerns. The team will start by asking brief general questions before going into the specific evaluation questions. Sensitive questions will be asked at the end of the interview after a rapport has developed between the interviewer and person(s) being interviewed. Issues identified in discussions will be followed up with additional questions to that individual/group, as well as by questions to other informants to corroborate the information as needed.

The evaluation team will be composed of three persons: an international team leader and two national experts. UNDP Tanzania has recruited these experts directly. All three team members have substantial experience with democratic governance and/or electoral assistance programs. The team will work in a collegial manner with the team leader responsible for the overall direction of the team and allocation of evaluation tasks. The team leader will be responsible for the delivery of the main deliverables (Evaluation Plan, Preliminary Findings, Draft and Final Reports) and will report to the UNDP Tanzania Country Director. The national experts will provide input and contribute to the drafting of these deliverables.

The workload for the evaluation will be divided up among the team based on their professional expertise and experience and their individual contractual terms of reference with UNDP. This will ensure that at least one of the team members has a good understanding of DEP assistance for each of the main output areas under review and is able to contribute to the writing and justifications for that section in the report. These allocations will be made in country after the team has had a chance to meet in person and discuss the work.

2.3 Measuring results

The evaluation team will use its professional judgment to assess the information collected and to answer the evaluation questions. Results will be measured in terms of the expected results outlined in the Results and Resources Framework in the Project Document and as refined subsequently, as well as by the participants' perceptions of the project and the team's assessment of the results found. Attribution of results directly to DEP may not be possible in some cases due to the time available for the evaluation, and the amount of work that has been done in the sector before DEP, or by other organizations, that are likely to have contributed to the same outcomes. However, where a direct correlation seems evident, this will be noted in the Evaluation Report.

2.4 Data sources and processing

The evaluation will use both primary and secondary data and a variety of data collection methods to gather the information needed to conduct the work. This is expected to include: desk review and analysis of DEP and secondary data; in person interviews in Dar-Es-Salaam and Zanzibar; and Skype and/or e-mail interviews for any key actors who may be in other locations. The team will review of documents before, during and after the field work as needed. It will spend time in country as a team to discuss findings and to review the data collected from the field. The desk work portions of the evaluation will be done individually by the evaluation team members, but the content will be discussed by the team during the field work and in preparation for the development of the Preliminary Findings and debrief for UNDP, EMBs and partners. The team's in-country work is expected to be done during regular UNDP working hours except for the weekend which the team will use to continue its review of documents, discussions and analysis.

The persons interviewed will be the main DEP partners, staff and beneficiaries. Statistical data, public opinion surveys and analytical reports will be used where available to gain supplemental information on electoral and political attitudes, practices and knowledge.

The team will review the most pertinent documents related to the electoral processes in Tanzania, which is expected to include the observer reports for the 2010 and 2015 elections; political analyses; public opinion polling data on electoral processes and civic participation; Government development plan, UNDP Country Programme Action Plan, and available project evaluation and progress reports.

The data collected through interviews, observation and review of documents will be processed in team discussions, and the main findings extrapolated and listed against the four intended outcome areas of the project. The team will synthesize those findings into the main points that will be discussed in the Evaluation Report. The evaluation team will maintain an impartial and professional view towards developing its findings, and will base them on the evidence found and against the anticipated outcomes according to the DEP Project Document. The team will arrive at its findings through consensus. If no consensus can be reached on a particular issue, this will be noted in the Evaluation Report.

The evaluation team will treat all information gathered as confidential and the Evaluation Report will not identify individual responses unless it has consent from that individual to use the information publically. The Evaluation Report will follow UNDP's standards for independent evaluation reporting.

3. Programme of Work

3.1 Phases and calendar of work

Time Frame	Tasks
Phase 1: Design, Plan and Develop Inception Report: 13 - 20 October 2016	
13 - 17 October	▪ Desk review of relevant program documents provided by UNDP
18 October	▪ Discussions with UNDP on evaluation process
20 October	▪ Submission of Inception Report
Phase 2: Data Collection and Analysis : 18 October - 4 November 2016	
18 - 31 October	▪ Conduct in-country consultations
Throughout	▪ Evaluation team discussions to assess findings
1 -2 November	▪ Develop Preliminary Findings
3 November	▪ Debriefing and validation workshop
Phase 3: Report Writing: 4 - 17 November 2016	
4 - 9 November	▪ Draft report
10 November	▪ Submit draft report to UNDP
o/a 14 November	▪ Receive UNDP feedback and incorporate feedback into report
17 November	▪ Submit Final Evaluation Report

3.2. Evaluation deliverables

The main outputs of the DEP Terminal Evaluation are:

- This Inception Report which describes the overall approach to the evaluation, including methodology, work plan and proposed structure of the Evaluation Report. The Inception Report will be submitted electronically.
- Preliminary Findings to be used in a validation workshop on the key findings of the evaluation. This is due at the end of the field work in Tanzania and will be submitted to UNDP prior to the workshop. This will be done electronically.
- Draft Evaluation Report of not more than 35 pages excluding annexes that present the Evaluation's main findings on DEP, its challenges, lessons learned, best practices, conclusions and recommendations. This report will follow UNDP's standard guidelines for independent evaluation reports. It will include a stand-alone Executive Summary of not more than 5 pages. A draft table of contents is provided in Annex 4 to this Inception Report. This draft Evaluation Report will be submitted electronically.
- Final Evaluation Report of not more than 35 pages, excluding annexes. The final report will be submitted electronically.

20 October 2016

Acronyms

AMS	Administrative Management System
BRIDGE	Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party
CMS	Candidate Management System
CO	Country Office (UNDP)
CNA	Capacity Needs Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DEP	Democratic Empowerment Project
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
DRM	Dispute Resolution Mechanism
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EMS	Electoral Management System
EPP	Electoral and Political Processes
ESP	Electoral Support Project
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith Based Organization
IRSS	Incident Reporting and Response System
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre
LOA	Letter of Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MP	Member of Parliament
NAM	Needs Assessment Mission
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NIDA	National Identification Authority
OMS	Observer Management System
OMZ	Office of the Mufti Zanzibar
ORPP	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RC	Resident Coordinator
RMS	Results Management System
PMT	Project Management Team
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
TA	Technical Assistance
TAMWA	Tanzania Media Women's Association
TCD	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Trainer-of-Trainers
TPF	Tanzania Police Force
TWCP	Tanzania Women Cross-Party Platform
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

USD	United States Dollar
UNV	United Nations Volunteer